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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 2007, using funds from the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and private foundations, 
the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) began piloting its version of a schoolwide reform model called the 
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP). Under the TAP model, teachers can earn extra pay and take 
on increased responsibilities through promotion (to mentor teacher or master teacher), and they 
become eligible for annual performance bonuses based on a combination of their contribution to 
student achievement (known as “value added”) and observed performance in the classroom. The 
model calls for weekly meetings of teachers and mentors (“cluster groups”), and regular classroom 
observations by a school leadership team to help teachers meet their performance goals. The idea 
behind TAP is that giving teachers performance incentives, along with tools to track their 
performance and improve instruction, will help schools attract and retain talented teachers and help 
all teachers raise student achievement. 
This report is the last in a series of reports providing evidence on the impacts of CPS’ version 
of TAP, called “Chicago TAP.” It presents findings from the four-year implementation period, with 
special emphasis on the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 school years, the third and fourth years of the 
program’s rollout in Chicago. Earlier reports (Glazerman et al. 2009; Glazerman and Seifullah 2010) 
provide detailed data on each of the first two years of the program, respectively. CPS implemented 
Chicago TAP as a pilot program intended for 40 high-need schools. The program began in 10 
schools in the first year (cohort 1) with a rollout plan to add 10 more Chicago TAP schools (cohorts 
2, 3, and 4) in each year of the TIF grant’s four-year implementation period. 
We address three research questions regarding Chicago TAP: 
1. How was the program implemented? 
2. What impact did the program have on student achievement? 
3. What impact did the program have on teacher retention within schools? 
The first question, about implementation, is needed to understand the answers to the next two, 
about impacts. We go on to address subquestions within each of these areas. For example, we 
explore whether impacts grow larger over time or as schools gain more experience with Chicago 
TAP. 
Chicago TAP was originally based on a national TAP model developed by the Milken Family 
Foundation in the late 1990s, but it includes some local adaptations. For instance, Chicago TAP 
determines the compensation given to teachers, and it offers performance pay for principals and 
other school staff in addition to teachers. Teacher performance was measured using a Skills, 
Knowledge and Responsibility (SKR) observation rubric, but unlike with the national model, value 
added performance was not measured at the individual teacher level in Chicago. It was initially 
measured at the school level and in its final two years, at the school-grade team level. On the basis of 
these performance measures, teachers in our data received an average bonus of approximately 
$1,100 in the first three years of district rollout (2007–2008, 2008–2009, and 2009–2010), rising to 
$1,400 for new Chicago TAP implementers in 2010–2011, with a maximum payout in these schools 
of less than $2,700 in any year. For a school’s second and third years of implementation, the average 
payout was approximately $2,500, with a maximum payout of $6,400, although in the fourth year of 
implementation the average payout was lower, about $1,900 with a maximum of less than $4,600. 
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Teachers who were selected to serve as mentor teachers received an additional salary augmentation 
of $7,000, and lead (master) teachers received $15,000 with a possibility for $20,000 in the final year 
for teachers designated as “lead plus.” 
Study Design and Data 
Our approach to estimating the impacts of Chicago TAP is based on a hybrid study design that 
relies on both the random assignment of schools to year of implementation (“experimental design”) 
and the careful matching of Chicago TAP schools to non-TAP schools in the district (“quasi-
experimental design”). The assignment of Chicago TAP schools to implementation year occurred in 
two rounds. In spring 2007, 16 noncharter elementary (K–8) schools, 2 charter elementary schools, 
and 2 high schools voluntarily applied for Chicago TAP and successfully completed the selection 
process. We used a lottery to determine the implementation year for the noncharter elementary 
schools, randomly assigning 8 to a treatment group that began Chicago TAP in fall 2007 (cohort 1) 
and 8 to a control group that began Chicago TAP in fall 2008 (cohort 2); CPS purposively assigned 
the charter and high schools. In spring 2009, Chicago TAP staff selected a second batch of 20 
schools from a new set of applicants and also replaced 2 schools that had exited the program. We 
again used a lottery to determine the program start date for 16 noncharter elementary schools and 
the 2 charter schools, randomly assigning 9 to begin Chicago TAP in fall 2009 (cohort 3) and the 
other 9 to begin Chicago TAP in fall 2010 (cohort 4).  
The experimental strategy has the advantage that any systematic differences in outcomes 
between cohorts 1 and 2 and between cohorts 3 and 4 can be attributed to the opportunity to 
implement one additional year of Chicago TAP. In the initial year, the design allows us to compare 
outcomes in schools that had been implementing Chicago TAP to a control group of schools that 
had not yet begun implementation, yielding an unbiased estimate of program impact. The drawbacks 
with this approach, however, are that we are limited to 34 schools and that our strategy for 
estimating impacts beyond the first year of implementation is indirect. In later years we can only 
estimate the impact of two versus one year of implementation, three versus two, and four versus 
three. This is because the control group was allowed to begin implementing Chicago TAP starting in 
the second year after randomization. 
To complement the experimental analysis, we used propensity score matching procedures to 
form for each year of rollout a non-TAP comparison group that was not implementing the program. 
The term “propensity score” refers to the summary measure, a combination of several different 
variables, that captures the probability, or “propensity,” that a school will be selected to implement 
Chicago TAP. By selecting non-TAP schools whose propensity scores are similar to those of the 
Chicago TAP schools, we hope to mimic an experiment; hence we call this design “quasi-
experimental.” 
To conduct the quasi-experimental analysis we gathered administrative data on over 300 CPS 
schools that were not participating in Chicago TAP and identified  those that were most closely 
matched to the Chicago TAP schools on preintervention characteristics such as size, school 
demographics, student achievement, and teacher retention measured prior to the Chicago TAP 
school selection. This quasi-experimental strategy does not offer the same protection against bias 
due to unobservable differences that the experimental strategy does. In comparing Chicago TAP 
schools to matched comparison schools, we can infer program impacts only if we assume that the 
observable characteristics used to match schools are similar and comprehensive enough that the 
remaining differences in outcomes can be attributed to Chicago TAP itself and not to unobserved 
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factors, such as a dynamic principal or an especially motivated teaching staff. Nevertheless, the 
matched comparison group can be much larger than the experimental control group.  
Another advantage of the quasi-experimental strategy is that it enables us to compare Chicago 
TAP schools to a group of matched comparison schools that remain non-TAP schools throughout 
the study. For outcomes such as teacher retention that can be affected by knowledge of future 
implementation, the randomized control group is never a pure standard of comparison because staff 
in the control schools know that their schools are slated to begin Chicago TAP the following school 
year; thus, the control group is also affected by Chicago TAP, although less directly than the 
treatment group. Consequently, our analysis of teacher retention is based on the matched 
comparison group rather than the randomized control group. For the period of overlap—the first 
year of implementation—we were able to compare outcomes for the quasi-experimental comparison 
group to those of the experimental control group to reconcile the two methods and validate the 
more inclusive quasi-experimental methodology. 
Data used for the study include teacher surveys and principal interviews as well as 
administrative data obtained from CPS. We administered a teacher questionnaire in spring 2008 and 
spring 2010 and interviewed principals in fall 2008. We obtained CPS student test score files 
covering all years beginning in 2006–2007 and teacher administrative records covering all years 
beginning in 2005–2006. CPS also provided us with the following data on Chicago TAP: teacher 
scores on the SKR classroom observation rubric performance, payouts by teacher, and scores on a 
program review that tells each Chicago TAP school how well they have been implementing the 
program over the current school year. 
Findings 
We present findings addressing each of the three research questions. 
Program implementation. To assess the first year under Chicago TAP for schools that began 
the program in fall 2009 (cohort 3), we looked at how teacher development and compensation 
practices in Chicago TAP schools differ from practices normally implemented in CPS schools. We 
found that teachers in Chicago TAP schools reported receiving significantly more mentoring 
support than teachers in similar non-TAP (control) schools. This finding reflects the fact that under 
the Chicago TAP model, teachers are guided by mentor teachers, and cluster groups meet weekly. 
We also found that veteran teachers in Chicago TAP schools were more likely than their control 
group counterparts to provide mentoring support to their colleagues; this finding is consistent with 
the fact that under Chicago TAP, teachers have the opportunity to assume leadership roles and 
responsibilities as Chicago TAP mentor or lead teachers. Teachers in Chicago TAP schools (veteran 
and novice) were aware of their eligibility for performance-based compensation. We found that the 
amount of compensation they expected approached the amount that was eventually paid out; that is, 
the average expectation was about $900, and the actual amount paid out in bonuses to this group 
was an average of about $1,100 per teacher. We generally did not find evidence of an impact of 
Chicago TAP on teacher attitudes or school climate. 
Program review scores provide evidence on the extent to which Chicago TAP schools 
implemented the program with fidelity to the national TAP model. Average scores were around 3 
out of 5 for each cohort of schools in each of the first three years of district rollout. The National 
Institute for Excellence in Teaching (NIET), which oversees the TAP system nationally, concluded 
that elements of TAP had been introduced, but TAP implementation had not been “rigorous.” After 
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the third year of rollout, NIET informed CPS that the district had not implemented the TAP 
system. In the final year of rollout, when CPS conducted the program reviews instead of NIET, the 
average scores were higher than 4 out of 5. 
We found two salient areas in which program implementation did not occur as initially planned, 
both of which were related to performance-based compensation. Average performance-based 
payouts were smaller than the originally stated targets. In addition, the teacher-level value-added 
component of performance-based compensation that was originally scheduled to begin in each 
school’s second year of program implementation was not implemented because the data that were 
needed to reliably link students and teachers were not available. 
Impacts on student achievement. While the introduction of Chicago TAP led to real changes 
inside the schools, the program did not consistently raise student achievement as measured by 
growth in Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) scores. We found evidence of both positive 
and negative test score impacts in selected subjects, years, and cohorts of schools, but overall there 
was no detectable impact on math, reading, or science achievement that was robust to different 
methods of estimation. For example, impacts on science scores overall (across years and cohorts) 
were positive, but not statistically significant unless we used one particular matching method that 
excluded some Chicago TAP schools from the analysis. 
Impacts on teacher retention. We did find evidence suggesting that Chicago TAP increased 
schools’ retention of teachers, although the impacts were not uniform or universal across years, 
cohorts, and subgroups of teachers. We found that teachers who were working in Chicago TAP 
schools in 2007 returned in each of the following three years at higher rates than teachers in 
comparable non-TAP schools. For example, we found that 67 percent of classroom teachers in 
cohort 1 schools in fall 2007 returned to their same school in fall 2010 compared to about 56 
percent of teachers in non-TAP schools, an impact of nearly 12 percentage points. In other words, 
teachers in Chicago TAP schools in fall 2007 were about 20% more likely than teachers in 
comparison schools to be in those same schools three years later. When we looked at teachers who 
were working in schools that started Chicago TAP in later years, some of the impact estimates were 
not statistically significant. We also found some evidence of impacts on retention for subgroups of 
teachers, such as those with less experience, but the pattern of findings was not consistent. When we 
considered retention of teachers in the district, we did not find consistent evidence of a measurable 
impact. Given that Chicago TAP is a school-specific program, our main focus was on school-level 
retention, as opposed to retention in the district. 
Conclusions 
Chicago TAP was only partially successfully in achieving its goals. Implementation of Chicago 
TAP increased the amount of mentoring, promotion opportunity, and compensation relative to 
non-TAP schools, and these increases alone may have translated into making Chicago TAP schools 
a more desirable place to continue working, as evidenced by the positive impacts on retention. 
However, these changes did not, in turn, pay off in terms of higher student achievement within the 
four-year rollout period in Chicago. This result provides a caution to funders investing in future 
programs in terms of what to expect over a four-year period. However, designers of new policies 





The practice of paying and promoting teachers based on classroom performance is gaining 
momentum in the United States. One program in particular, the Teacher Advancement Program 
(TAP), has become a model for schools around the country. TAP links teacher performance 
measures to pay and aligns mentoring and professional development with the performance measures 
so that teachers have the resources to improve their practice. This report provides evidence on the 
implementation and impacts of Chicago Public Schools’ version of TAP, known as Chicago TAP. 
A. Improving Schools Through TAP 
TAP was developed in the late 1990s by the Milken Family Foundation (MFF) as a schoolwide 
program to improve schools by raising teacher quality. Under the TAP model, teachers can earn 
extra pay and be given increasing responsibilities through promotion (to mentor teacher or master 
teacher), and they are eligible for annual performance bonuses based on a combination of their 
contribution to student achievement (known as “value added”) and observed performance in the 
classroom. The model also calls for weekly meetings of teachers and mentors (“cluster groups”), and 
regular classroom observations by a school leadership team to help teachers meet their performance 
goals. The idea behind the program is that giving teachers performance incentives, along with tools 
to track their performance and improve instruction, will help schools attract and retain talented 
teachers and help all teachers raise student achievement. 
B. More Evidence Needed 
TAP has been implemented in more than 200 schools in 13 states around the country and is 
overseen by the National Institute for Excellence in Teaching (NIET), an organization started by 
MFF. The most recent expansion of TAP came via the U.S. Department of Education’s Teacher 
Incentive Fund (TIF), which makes grants to states and localities implementing performance-based 
compensation systems in high-need schools. These and related efforts to reform teacher pay and 
promotion (by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, among others) have raised a great deal of 
interest and controversy. The question for researchers is whether there is any evidence that TAP or 
other teacher pay reforms improve the teaching workforce and raise student achievement. 
Apart from the current study, much of the existing evidence about the effects of TAP comes 
from six reports. The program developers have conducted four studies of their own program 
(Schacter et al. 2002, 2004; Solmon et al. 2007; Daley and Kim 2010); one independent research 
team conducted a study using schools in two unnamed states (Springer et al. 2008), and an 
undergraduate student wrote a thesis on TAP (Hudson 2010) using data from the same 10 states 
studied by Daley and Kim. All of these studies were quasi-experimental, meaning that the 
researchers relied on self-selected samples of TAP schools and non-TAP schools for their 
comparisons. The fundamental challenge for program impact evaluations is that unmeasured factors 
can determine both a school’s decision to participate in TAP (or be selected by NIET to participate) 
and the outcomes being studied. When researchers compare TAP and non-TAP schools, there is a 
danger that these unmeasured factors will be confounded with the true impact, a problem known as 
selection bias. The studies each used different methods—for example, statistical matching—to 
address this problem.  
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The current study is the first to use random assignment of schools to program implementation 
status as a way to control selection bias and is also the first to validate quasi-experimental methods 
(such as matching) using experimental methods (selection via random assignment). This validation is 
discussed further below. 
The first two NIET studies (Schacter et al. 2002, 2004) relied on comparison groups that were 
small, self-selected samples. The more recent NIET report, by Solmon et al. (2007), includes larger 
numbers of comparison schools and teachers, a total of 61 TAP and 285 non-TAP schools across 
six states. As in the two earlier reports, the comparison schools were chosen as a convenience 
sample of schools from other districts that agreed to supply data and may not be representative of 
the outcomes that TAP schools would have realized if they had not adopted the program. Using 
comparison schools from different districts confounds district differences with TAP effects. 
Because TAP schools are carefully selected and typically volunteer to go through the many steps 
required to adopt the program, comparisons with nonselected schools could lead to biased program 
impact estimates. For example, schools that are able to attract the funding required to mount TAP 
may already be more effective than schools that are not able to attract such funding. Similarly, a 
school that NIET determines is “ready” to implement TAP may have faculty and leaders more 
willing to improve than a school that is not ready to implement, and this disparity would appear as a 
positive difference regardless of the true impact of TAP. Each of the NIET-sponsored reports 
found evidence of high percentages of TAP teachers and schools outperforming their comparison 
counterparts. The studies did not compare the mean outcomes from the student-level data so it is 
unclear if the results obtained by aggregating to the school level would also hold if the results had 
been generated by counting every student or teacher equally. 
Springer et al. (2008) used a panel data set of math scores from TAP and non-TAP schools in 
two states and found positive impacts for elementary grades but undetectable or negative impacts 
for middle and high school grades. Importantly, the Springer et al. report presents evidence of 
selection effects by explicitly modeling the process of adopting TAP with an ordered probit model. 
This result is not surprising given the screening and self-selection that must take place for a school 
to adopt TAP. To become a TAP school, the faculty must vote to adopt the program, usually must 
raise substantial funds to finance the bonus pool, and often must be found worthy of the investment 
by NIET or a state or local sponsor. 
Hudson relied on a synthetic control group method, a method similar to propensity score 
matching, in which each TAP school was matched to a weighted average of non-TAP schools in the 
same state. The author also used a difference-in-difference model, which controlled for the lower 
average test scores in TAP schools to isolate a TAP effect from the effect of other variables that do 
not change over time. The study found positive effects of TAP on math scores, with effect sizes 
ranging from 0.13 to 0.24 depending on the model. Reading score effect sizes ranged from 0.05 (not 
statistically significant) to 0.13 (significant). 
The current study, about which two earlier reports have been released (Glazerman et al. 2009; 
Glazerman and Seifullah 2010), aims to expand this body of knowledge by using random assignment 
methods and focusing on a single district’s experience implementing the TAP model. Importantly, 
the non-TAP schools all come from the same district as the TAP schools. 
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C. Chicago TAP and the Evaluation 
1.  Research Questions 
This report focuses on one TIF grantee, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS). We address three 
research questions regarding Chicago TAP: 
1. How was the program implemented? 
2. What impact did the program have on student achievement? 
3. What impact did the program have on teacher retention within schools? 
The first question, about implementation, is needed to understand the answers to the next two, 
about impacts. We go on to address subquestions within each of these areas. For example, we 
explore whether impacts grow larger over time or as schools gain more experience with Chicago 
TAP. We also address methodological questions needed to interpret the impact estimates. 
Specifically, as explained below, we exploit the timing of the rollout of Chicago TAP to validate the 
statistical methods used throughout the impact analysis. 
2.  The Program Under Study 
The school system implemented Chicago TAP as a pilot program intended for 40 high-need 
schools. The program began in 10 schools in fall 2007 (cohort 1) with a rollout plan to add 10 new 
Chicago TAP schools in each year of the TIF grant’s four-year implementation period. Chicago TAP 
was originally based on the national TAP model, but it makes some local adaptations. For instance, 
Chicago TAP determines the compensation given to teachers, and it offers performance pay for 
principals and other school staff in addition to teachers. 
For performing their extra duties, mentor teachers receive an additional $7,000 per year and 
lead teachers an additional $15,000.1
                                                 
1 For the final year of program rollout, Chicago TAP added a “lead plus” position in which a lead teacher supports 
two other Chicago TAP schools in addition to his or her home Chicago TAP school. Lead plus teachers receive an 
additional $5,000 per year, for a total stipend of $20,000. 
 Program documents indicate that in the first year of 
implementing Chicago TAP, the pool for teacher performance bonuses was supposed to support an 
average bonus of $2,000 per teacher based on value added to student achievement and observed 
classroom performance (Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union 2007; Chicago 
Public Education Fund n.d.). In subsequent years, the target average payout was supposed to rise to 
$4,000 per teacher. We show in Chapter III that payouts were lower than these initially planned 
levels, with an average for most cohorts of about $1,100 in the first year of a school’s 
implementation, $2,500 in the second and third years, and $1,900 in the fourth year. Principals can 
earn up to $5,000 each year based on the quality of program implementation and schoolwide value 
added. Other school staff can receive up to $500 in the first year and $1,000 in subsequent years 
based on schoolwide value added.  
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3.  Study Design and the Current Report 
Chicago TAP provides a unique opportunity to learn about the impacts of the popular TAP 
model as adapted and implemented in a particular school district. To address issues of selection bias 
raised above, we designed a randomized experiment to estimate the impacts of Chicago TAP on 
student and teacher outcomes. School officials who wanted their school to implement Chicago TAP 
had to submit an initial application, and the selection process also involved site visits by Chicago 
TAP and CPS staff, a faculty vote (with at least 75 percent approval), and a successful final 
application with responses to essay questions. Schools had two opportunities to apply for Chicago 
TAP, one during the 2006–2007 school year and one during the 2008–2009 school year.  
The experimental design, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, was implemented in two 
rounds, corresponding to the two opportunities for schools to apply to Chicago TAP. Of the 16 
noncharter elementary schools that went through this process and were selected by district officials 
as finalists in spring 2007, we randomly assigned eight to a treatment group that began implementing 
Chicago TAP in 2007–2008 (cohort 1) and the other eight to a control group that delayed 
implementation until 2008–2009 (cohort 2). In spring 2009, we randomly assigned a new group of 
successful Chicago TAP applicant schools, including the charter schools: eight CPS elementary 
schools and one charter school were assigned to implement Chicago TAP in 2009–2010 (cohort 3) 
and another eight CPS elementary schools and the other charter school were assigned to implement 
in the final year of the grant program, 2010–2011 (cohort 4).2
The quasi-experimental design, which is also discussed in the next chapter, relies on matching 
of Chicago TAP schools to non-TAP schools. This approach is especially promising in Chicago 
because the limited funding available to implement the program meant that there was a large pool of 
nonparticipating schools, many of which could be promising candidates for the program and hence 
make “good” matches. It is also promising in this setting because the overlap of experimental and 
quasi-experimental samples means that we can validate the matching methods to gauge the extent to 
which the matched comparison group replicates the experience of having a randomized control 
group. Finally, we have baseline test score and teacher turnover data that allow us to calculate 
preintervention measures of the key outcomes of interest and use them to estimate quasi-
experimental impacts. These are all factors that have been associated with more successful (lower-
bias) quasi-experimental evaluation designs (Glazerman et al. 2003). The difference between the 
 In the first year after random 
assignment, the difference between the outcomes for schools assigned to implement early and 
schools assigned to delay implementation represents the impact of Chicago TAP during that time 
period, because the only systematic difference between the two sets of schools is the ability to begin 
implementing Chicago TAP. In later years, the difference between the groups can be used to 
generate a similarly unbiased impact estimate, but that impact represents the effect of having a one-
year head start implementing the program, rather than the impact of implementing versus not 
implementing it. 
                                                 
2 All 34 schools had grades K–8 and are considered by CPS to be elementary schools. In addition to these 
randomly assigned elementary schools, the district selected four high schools and six other K–8 schools as Chicago TAP 
schools. In spring 2007, the district purposively assigned two high schools and two charter schools to implement 
Chicago TAP—one of each beginning in 2007 and the others in 2008. In spring 2009, CPS purposively assigned two 
new high school applicants to begin Chicago TAP in either 2009 or 2010. The district also replaced two elementary 
schools that had exited the program with two new schools selected by Chicago TAP staff to start Chicago TAP in fall 
2009 and two additional schools to begin in 2010, replacing two cohort 4 schools that had dropped out. 
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Chicago TAP and matched comparison schools represents the estimated impact of the program for 
a given time period and cohort. Nevertheless, we caution that quasi-experimental results are 
potentially subject to selection bias and should be interpreted with caution. 
This report presents experimental findings on the impacts of Chicago TAP on all 34 CPS 
elementary (K–8) schools and charter schools that had been randomly assigned to implement the 
program in each of the four rollout years (cohorts 1, 2, 3, and 4, assigned to begin implementing in 
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively). We also present quasi-experimental evidence on Chicago 
TAP effects for the same group expanded to include charter schools and “replacement” schools that 
were added to the roster of Chicago TAP schools when other schools closed or stopped 
implementing the program.  
The current report summarizes the findings from all four years of Chicago TAP rollout. 
Additional detail on the first two years’ experiences can be found in earlier reports (Glazerman et al. 
2009; Glazerman and Seifullah 2010).  
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II. METHODS AND DATA 
Our approach to estimating the impacts of Chicago TAP is based on a hybrid study design that 
relies on both the random assignment of schools to year of implementation and the careful 
matching of Chicago TAP schools to non-TAP CPS schools. Below, we discuss these methods and 
the data on which the analysis is based, and we present some simple descriptive statistics on the 
study sample. 
A. Hybrid Study Design 
The hybrid study design is shown in Figure II.1. Each box in the figure represents a group of 
schools. To estimate the impacts of the program in a given year, we compare the schools across the 
row: Chicago TAP schools to control schools, Chicago TAP schools to comparison schools, or 
Chicago TAP schools with more experience implementing the program to Chicago TAP schools 
with less experience. The baseline year for the first three columns of schools is 2007. We follow 
these schools for up to four years. For the other schools, the baseline is 2009 and we follow them 
for two years, because the study ended in 2011. 
Specifically, the random assignment component, which we call the “experimental” design, 
proceeded as follows. We randomly assigned 16 preselected K–8 schools to begin implementing 
Chicago TAP in either fall 2007 or fall 2008.3 In spring 2009 we repeated this process and assigned 
another 18 preselected K–8 schools to begin implementing in either fall 2009 or fall 2010.4
We continued with the experimental design by comparing cohort 1 to cohort 2 in spring 2009, 
spring 2010, and spring 2011. We also followed up on the cohort 3–cohort 4 comparison in spring 
2011. All of these comparisons are made between adjacent pairs of blue boxes in Figure II.1. In each 
of these cases, both groups had been implementing Chicago TAP, but the experimental comparison 
represents the effect of having one additional year of implementation experience. At the outset of 
the study, we hypothesized that having more time to implement Chicago TAP might result in better 
outcomes.   
 We refer 
to these groups of schools as cohorts 1 through 4, respectively. Comparisons for 2007–2008 could 
be carried out for cohorts 1 (“treatment,” represented by the blue box) and 2 (“control,” represented 
by the red box), since cohort 2 had not yet begun implementing Chicago TAP during this period. 
Similarly, comparisons for 2009–2010 could be carried out for cohorts 3 (“treatment”) and 4 
(“control”), since cohort 4 had not yet begun implementing Chicago TAP during this period. Results 
from the first comparison were presented in the year 1 report (Glazerman et al. 2009); the current 
report includes results from the second experimental comparison and also combines the two, to 
represent the impact of Chicago TAP in its first year of implementation. 
                                                 
3 The schools had been preselected by CPS using a series of school information sessions, initial interest 
applications, and site visits to assess staff’s ability and readiness to benefit from the program. 
4 In spring 2007, 16 noncharter K–8 elementary schools were randomly assigned and two K–8 charter schools 
were purposively assigned. In spring 2009, all elementary schools—16 noncharter and 2 charter—were randomly 
assigned. We also collected data on four high schools—one of each was purposively assigned to start each fall. Because 
the high schools were purposively assigned by CPS and comparable data were not available on test scores, this report 
focuses on elementary (K–8) schools. Charter schools were excluded from the teacher retention analysis because 
comparable data were not available for teaching assignments. 
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Figure II.1. Hybrid Study Design 
 
The other component of the study design, the matched comparison, is “quasi-experimental.” In 
this approach, we gathered administrative data on over 300 Chicago schools that were not 
participating in Chicago TAP, and then used statistical methods described below to identify the 
schools that were most closely matched to each group of Chicago TAP schools. These matching 
non-TAP schools formed the comparison group, with weights representing the degree to which 
each comparison school mostly closely matched a Chicago TAP school.  
Each design strategy has advantages that complements the other by offsetting its disadvantages. 
The experimental strategy has the advantage of methodological rigor—any systematic differences in 
outcomes between cohorts 1 and 2 or between cohorts 3 and 4 can be causally attributed to the early 
implementation of the program in cohorts 1 and 3. In the first and third years of the study’s 
observation period, the 2007–2008 and 2009–2010 school years, this provides us with a comparison 
between Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools. In subsequent years, we must interpret the differences 
in outcomes between each pair of cohorts (1 versus 2 and 3 versus 4) as the effect of having one 
extra year of experience implementing the program. 
A disadvantage of the experimental design is the reliance on just 34 schools. There may be 
chance differences between the 17 treatment and 17 control schools that make it difficult to detect 
any true impacts.  
Another drawback of random assignment to a delayed implementation status is that once the 
delay period is over, the control group is no longer untreated. This means that the experimental 
design is only helpful in generating a “clean” impact estimate for the first year of implementation. 
























































II: Methods and Data  Mathematica Policy Research 
9 
Moreover, for outcomes that can be affected by knowledge of future implementation, such as 
teacher retention, the randomized control group is never a pure standard of comparison. That is, the 
control group is also affected by Chicago TAP, although less directly than the treatment group, 
because the school’s staff know that they will be implementing Chicago TAP in the future, and that 
knowledge could change their behavior. On the other hand, the matched comparison group can be 
much larger than the randomized control group, even if the treatment group is limited in size; 
moreover, its members continue to be non-TAP schools during the course of the study, allowing 
more years for a comparison between Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools. However, in order to 
use the matched comparison group to infer program impacts, we must assume that the observable 
characteristics used to match schools are sufficiently similar and comprehensive that the remaining 
differences in outcomes can be attributed to Chicago TAP itself and not to other factors that were 
not observed, such as a dynamic principal or a motivated teaching staff. 
1.  Random Assignment Procedures 
Whenever random assignment is conducted with a small number of experimental units, chance 
differences between the assigned groups—differences that have nothing to do with actual treatment 
status—are more likely to arise. This likelihood is reflected in the statistical hypothesis tests 
performed and standard errors calculated along with the estimates of program impact. Even with a 
given sample, it is possible to achieve through careful random assignment procedures a sample 
whose treatment and control groups are better matched on observable characteristics and which 
therefore supports more precise estimation of program impacts.  
Specifically, we used the many observable characteristics of schools to improve the chances that 
schools assigned to the treatment versus control group would have similar characteristics. This 
method is based on constrained randomization, sometimes referred to as dynamic minimization (see 
Glazerman et al. [2006] for an application to an experiment on teacher induction and McEntegart 
[2003] for a more general discussion). In assigning cohorts 1 and 2 we imposed constraints on the 
randomization so that the largest and smallest school (in terms of student enrollment) were in the 
same Chicago TAP cohort (treatment or control), the three schools with a predominantly non–
African American student body were not in the same cohort, and neither cohort had more than one 
pair of schools from the same geographic area of the city. In assigning cohorts 3 and 4 we imposed 
constraints so that the difference in average enrollment between cohorts was less than 100 students, 
the difference in average total score on the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) was less than 
six scale points, the three schools where fewer than 95 percent of students were African-American 
were not all in the same cohort, and both cohorts had representation of each geographic area that 
contained more than one school.5
After the lottery assigning schools into cohorts was conducted, the research team sent the 
school assignments to CPS, and the district informed principals in the spring to plan early 
implementation procedures such as orientation and hiring of mentor and master teachers.
  
6
                                                 
5 To achieve balance on geographic location in assigning cohorts 3 and 4, we imposed constraints so that the two 
area 3 schools were not in the same cohort, the three area 12 schools were not in the same cohort, and fewer than four 
of the five area 17 schools were in the same cohort. Each of the remaining schools came from different areas.  
 Teachers 
in Chicago TAP schools were provided an orientation over the summer. 
6 The lotteries were conducted in May 2007 and March 2009. 
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2.  Propensity Score Matching Procedures 
Propensity score matching methods were used to identify non-TAP schools whose students 
were as nearly similar to those in Chicago TAP schools as possible (see Appendix A for a more 
technical discussion of the matches). We first eliminated schools where fewer than 50 percent of 
students were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. In order to be selected for Chicago TAP, a 
school had to have at least 75 percent of its students qualifying for free or reduced-price lunch. We 
also eliminated from consideration for the teacher retention analysis any schools that had been 
selected to implement Chicago TAP beginning in either fall 2009 or fall 2010. 7 Teachers’ behavior in 
these schools might have been influenced by the knowledge that the school was slated to begin the 
program in the near future. Then we matched the remaining schools in each year along dimensions 
we believed were related to student achievement and teacher retention, such as prior average 
achievement and retention as well as other factors listed below. All variables were measured before 
the schools implemented Chicago TAP; in particular, all variables except teacher retention were 
measured in 2006–2007.8
• School size, measured using student enrollment and student enrollment squared (to 
capture nonlinearities in the relationship between size and outcomes) 
 Because knowledge of future implementation might have affected the 
decision to return to a school, we measured teacher retention before schools in each cohort learned 
of their Chicago TAP implementation year. Teacher retention was measured as the percentage of 
teachers in fall 2005 who returned to the school in fall 2006. We matched along the following 
dimensions: 
• Teacher retention, measured as the percentage of novice teachers (having less than 5 
years of experience) who returned to the school and the percentage of midcareer 
teachers (having 5–24 years of experience) who returned 
• School accountability status, measured as indicators of the number of years since the 
school last met goals for adequate yearly progress 
• Student achievement, measured using average math and reading scores on the ISAT, 
standardized within grade across the district 
• Student race/ethnicity, measured as the percentage of students who were non-Hispanic 
African American and the percentage of students who were Hispanic, with the two 
variables collapsed into three categories: more than two-thirds, between one-third and 
two-thirds, and less than one-third African American or Hispanic, respectively 
• Student poverty, measured as the percentage of students qualifying for free or reduced-
price lunch 
• Student special education status, measured as the percentage of students who had an 
Individualized Education Program 
                                                 
7 An exception occurred for analysis of fall 2007 to fall 2008 retention rates for cohort 1 schools. Because teachers 
in cohort 3 and 4 schools did not learn of their future Chicago TAP status until spring 2009, fall 2007 to fall 2008 
retention decisions could not have been affected by knowledge of their future Chicago TAP status. 
8 For a small number of schools that expanded by more than two grades between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, we 
used a later baseline. All variables except teacher retention for these schools were measured in 2008–2009; teacher 
retention was measured as the percentage of teachers in fall 2007 who returned to the school in fall 2008. 
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• Student language proficiency, measured as the percentage of students who were limited 
English proficient   
• Charter school status, measured as an indicator for whether the school was a charter 
school9
The procedure itself is a propensity score match using the nearest five neighbors with 
replacement. That means that we listed the observable factors that predict selection into the Chicago 
TAP finalist pool and used them in a logistic regression model to predict the probability of being in 
that pool. The predicted probability (“propensity score”) from this model was used to rank all the 
schools sequentially along a number line, and each Chicago TAP school in each year was matched to 
the five non-TAP schools whose propensity scores were closest to that of the Chicago TAP school, 




The result of this matching was a group of non-TAP schools that was observationally similar to 
the Chicago TAP schools once we applied the appropriate weights. The degree of similarity is 
illustrated in Section D of this chapter; Appendix A provides more technical details on the matching. 
The particular matching method we used was chosen based solely on the quality of the matches 
produced—that is, before seeing the outcome data.  
 If non-TAP schools matched with more than one Chicago TAP school, 
they received proportionally more weight in the analysis. 
B. Impact Estimation 
The impacts of Chicago TAP can be estimated by comparing the outcomes observed in 
Chicago TAP schools to those observed in similar non-TAP schools. The non-TAP schools are 
used to approximate the counterfactual condition, that is, the outcomes that would have been 
observed had the Chicago TAP schools not implemented the program. After four years of Chicago 
TAP, we have several comparisons to choose from, depending on the year and the outcome. Each 
time period and subgroup has a slightly different interpretation in light of the hypothesized learning 
effects with Chicago TAP. Within each impact chapter we discuss in more detail the specific 
contrasts we examine, but here we discuss the experimental contrasts. 
For the first and third years after rollout, there was a randomized control group of schools that 
were not implementing Chicago TAP at all. In those years, the test score outcomes can be compared 
because they would not be influenced by the prospect of implementing Chicago TAP in the future. 
For test score outcomes in other years, or teacher retention outcomes in all years, there are several 
ways to form a (nonexperimental) comparison group of non-TAP schools, depending on which 
matching method we follow.  
                                                 
9 Charter school status was used only for the student achievement analysis. As noted earlier, charter schools were 
excluded from the teacher retention analysis because administrative data on teaching assignments were not available for 
charter schools. 
10 We determined that nearest five neighbors produced the most efficient matches, but we repeated all the analyses 
using the single nearest neighbor as well as other matching algorithms, including ones that selected all neighbors within a 
certain distance or “caliper” size, which we varied, and all neighbors with weights related to distance (known as kernel 
density matching). 
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For the student achievement analysis, we first present experimental results comparing two 
groups: the first is cohort 1 and cohort 3 Chicago TAP schools in their first year of implementation, 
and the second is cohort 2 and cohort 4 schools that had not yet begun Chicago TAP. We then 
present quasi-experimental results comparing Chicago TAP schools in each year to matched 
comparison schools. We perform robustness checks and reconcile the findings for the two sets of 
analyses. 
Knowledge that cohort 2 schools would implement Chicago TAP in 2008–2009 may have 
affected the decision of teachers to return in fall 2008 (and similarly for cohort 4 schools in 2010–
2011), so we designed the study to use quasi-experimental methods for estimating the impacts of 
teacher retention even for the first year of implementation. We compared retention of teachers in 
Chicago TAP schools to retention of teachers in carefully constructed matched comparison groups 
through fall 2010. We did not analyze retention through fall 2011 because teachers knew during the 
2010–2011 school year that Chicago TAP would not be continued in 2011–2012; therefore there is 
no reason to expect that Chicago TAP would influence teachers’ decisions to return to former 
Chicago TAP schools in fall 2011. 
1.  Dropouts, Consolidations, and School Closures 
Several Chicago TAP schools have experienced substantial changes that pose a complication for 
the estimation of program impacts. Effective for the 2009–2010 school year (the third year of the 
rollout), two cohort 1 schools discontinued Chicago TAP; in addition, a cohort 2 school was closed. 
Effective for the 2010–2011 school year, a cohort 1 school was closed and its students and faculty 
sent to another school that began implementing Chicago TAP that year. Also, a cohort 3 school was 
reconstituted with all new staff, and two cohort 4 schools randomly assigned to begin Chicago TAP 
did not implement the program.  
For the experimental analysis of test scores we estimated impacts including all schools that had 
been randomly assigned to Chicago TAP, even if they had exited the program. These estimates 
based on the full sample of randomly assigned schools (called “intention-to-treat” estimates) exploit 
the statistical equivalence between treatment and control groups created by random assignment. 
That is, randomly assigning schools ensures that there are no systematic differences between the 
entire treatment group and the entire control group prior to starting Chicago TAP. The difference in 
average outcomes between the full treatment group and the full control group yields an unbiased 
estimate of the impact of being offered Chicago TAP, not necessarily the impact of implementing 
Chicago TAP. This distinction mattered only for the last two years of the analysis. 
For the quasi-experimental analysis of test scores by cohort, we dropped schools that were 
closed or that discontinued the program—along with their matched comparison schools—beginning 
in the school year the changes went into effect. For example, if the change went into effect for the 
2010–2011 school year, the staff knew of the change late in the prior (2009–2010) school year. 
Nevertheless, we assume the March 2010 test score results were unaffected.  
For the teacher retention analysis, however, we dropped schools beginning in the school year 
prior to the change going into effect. Consider, for example, changes effective for the 2010–2011 
school year. The retention analysis measures the outcome (teachers returning to the same school or 
to the district) as of fall 2010, after the school transitions had gone into effect. Consequently, we 
dropped all of the schools affected by transitions in 2009–2010 or 2010–2011 and their comparison 
group counterparts. 
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2.  Regression-Adjusted Means 
When presenting outcomes in this report (in Chapters IV and V), we typically show 
“regression-adjusted” means. A regression-adjusted mean for a particular group (for example, 
Chicago TAP schools) represents a predicted average outcome for the entire analysis sample (both 
Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools) if each one had been assigned to that group. The prediction is 
based on a regression model—a linear model for continuous outcomes and a logistic model for 
dichotomous outcomes—that controls for a range of teacher or student characteristics. Regression-
adjusted means have the useful property that their difference equals the impact estimate, although 
they do typically differ slightly from unadjusted means. Thus nearly all means reported in the impact 
chapters of this report should be interpreted as the mean outcome for the whole sample as if all 
sample members had been implementing Chicago TAP or all sample members had not been 
implementing Chicago TAP. 
For teacher retention analyses, the regression model controlled for the following variables: 
• Teacher education (having a master’s degree or higher) 
• Teaching assignment (teaching a tested or nontested academic subject in grades four 
through eight)  
• Years of service in CPS  
• Prior teacher retention at the school (percentage of novice teachers and percentage of 
midcareer teachers in fall 2005, or fall 2007 for cohort 3, who returned to the school in 
fall 2006, or fall 2008 for cohort 3)  
• Prior student achievement (average math and reading ISAT scores)  
• Student race/ethnicity (percentage of students who were African American or Hispanic) 
• Student language (percentage of students who had limited English proficiency) 
• Student poverty (percentage of students who qualified for free/reduced-price lunch) 
• School size  
For student test score analyses, the model controlled for the following variables: 
• Prior student achievement (math and reading ISAT scores) 
• Family poverty (eligibility for free/reduced-price lunch) 
• Special needs (whether an Individualized Education Program was in place) 
• Language (whether limited English proficient) 
• Race/ethnicity 
• Grade level  
• Age (whether older than the normal age for a grade)  
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We accounted for the clustering of students or teachers within schools by estimating robust 
standard errors. In addition, we conducted numerous sensitivity tests to determine whether the 
results were robust to the choice of regression model or other decisions. Those tests are described in 
more detail in the discussion of findings. 
C. Data 
The study’s data fall into two broad categories: (1) data collected directly from teachers and 
principals in the sampled schools by Mathematica Policy Research, and (2) administrative data 
provided by CPS.  
In the first category, Mathematica administered a questionnaire in spring 2008, towards the end 
of the first year of the program, to a group of teachers in Chicago TAP cohort 1 schools, cohort 2 
schools, and a group of schools matched to cohorts 1 and 2. The survey was repeated in 2010 with a 
new sample consisting of teachers from cohort 3 schools, cohort 4 schools, and an additional 
comparison group of schools matched to cohorts 3 and 4. The results presented here focus on the 
2010 survey, whose findings were similar to those of the 2008 survey, presented in an earlier report 
(Glazerman et al. 2009). The school principal interviews were conducted in 2008 as well and are also 
summarized in that same report. Those interviews were mainly used to validate the teacher retention 
analysis and to detect the possible presence of a harmful effect of Chicago TAP on school climate. 
We did not find any such evidence, nor did we find any reason to doubt the administrative data, so 
we did not repeat the principal interviews and they are not discussed in this report. 
In the second category, we used CPS human resources records for information on teachers, and 
CPS student testing records for information on student assessments. In addition, we used data 
provided by CPS on program review scores (which measure fidelity of implementation to the TAP 
model), teacher observation scores, and teacher bonus payouts under Chicago TAP. 
1.  Teacher Survey 
In spring 2010 we administered a questionnaire to all eligible teachers in cohort 3, cohort 4, and 
sampled matched comparison schools. We included Chicago TAP lead teachers and all sampled 
schools’ teachers who had a program code identifying them as a regular classroom teacher of an 
academic subject. The questionnaire gathered data that were not available in the CPS administrative 
records. It included six sections focusing on the following areas: (1) teachers’ educational 
background and professional experience, their certification status, and their current teaching 
assignment; (2) the types of professional development and support that teachers receive at their 
schools; (3) the leadership roles and responsibilities teachers have assumed in addition to their 
regular classroom teaching duties; (4) the compensation, or potential for compensation, associated 
with teachers’ performance and that of their students; (5) teachers’ attitudes about and satisfaction 
with various aspects of their school and the opportunities provided to them; and (6) teachers’ basic 
demographic characteristics. 
We mailed the questionnaire to teachers at their schools in mid-March, and continued collecting 
responses through mid-July, either as self-administered paper questionnaires returned by the 
teachers or through telephone interviews. Of the 826 eligible teachers, 617 completed the survey, for 
a final response rate of 75 percent (79 percent for treatment, 78 percent for control, and 69 percent 
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for matched comparison teachers).11
2. Administrative Data on Students, All Teachers, and Chicago TAP Participants 
 Nonresponse adjustment weights were used in all analyses to 
account for any observable differences between respondents and nonrespondents. We computed the 
nonresponse adjustment weights using teacher experience level, whether the teacher has a master’s 
degree, and school characteristics (such as years since the school last made adequate yearly progress, 
attendance rate, and percentages of students who were limited English proficient, low-income, 
African American, and Hispanic). 
We obtained student demographic and test data from CPS. The test data were from the ISAT, 
the state assessments in mathematics and reading for grades three through eight and in science for 
grades four and seven. Table II.1 shows the average ISAT scores for math and reading by grade 
level, as well as the corresponding standard deviations, for the study baseline; data are from March 
2007. As the table shows, the scores rise with grade level, suggesting that the tests are scored on a 
developmental scale. That is, the 11-point difference between the average fourth-grade math score 
and the average fifth-grade math score, for example, can be thought of as a single year of growth, so 
one point represents 1/11, or 0.09, school years of growth, equivalent to roughly 3.5 weeks of 
learning in a school year with 38 weeks. We did not have science data for 2007. 
Table II.1. Properties of the Baseline ISAT Test Scores by Subject and Grade Level, March 2007  
Grade 
Reading  Math 
Mean Standard Deviation  Mean Standard Deviation 
All grades 222.8 27.8  236.9 30.0 
Grade 4 202.5 25.9  213.6 25.9 
Grade 5 212.1 25.7  224.6 26.8 
Grade 6 222.5 23.5  235.9 25.8 
Grade 7 229.7 24.3  244.6 25.9 
Grade 8 242.0 23.0  259.7 24.4 
Note: Data pertain to 93,657 students in 308 schools. 
The standard deviation within a grade level can also be used to interpret the size of score 
differences. For example, a standard deviation of 26 points (the value for grade four math) means 
that a one-point difference corresponds to 1/26th, or 0.04, standard deviation units. If test scores 
are normally distributed, then this is the same as a difference between performance at the 50th and 
the 52nd percentiles.12
In addition, we obtained data on student background information, such as race, gender, 
free/reduced-price lunch eligibility, enrollment status, and disability or special education status. CPS 
provided these data for the 2006–2007 through 2009–2010 school years. 
 
                                                 
11 Among teachers in noncharter elementary schools, response rates were 79 percent overall, 84 percent for cohort 
3, 82 percent for cohort 4, and 75 percent for matched comparison teachers. 
12 More precisely, an effect size of 0.0384 corresponds to a change in the cumulative normal probability of 0.015 if 
the starting probability is 0.500. 
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We also obtained administrative data on teachers’ credentials, years of service in the district, and 
teaching assignments from the CPS Talent Office. Data cover the 2005–2006 through 2010–2011 
school years. 
Finally, CPS provided us with the following data on Chicago TAP: teacher scores on the Skills, 
Knowledge, and Responsibilities classroom observation rubric performance; payouts by teacher; and 
scores on a program review that tells each Chicago TAP school how well they have been 
implementing the program over the current school year. 
D. Sample Characteristics 
Tables II.2 through II.4 show the characteristics of the schools in the study; they indicate 
characteristics of students at baseline and of teachers during the study period. The statistics are 
presented by school group, with students and teachers in Chicago TAP schools compared to their 
counterparts in control and matched comparison schools. We present tests of statistical significance 
of the difference between Chicago TAP and each comparison group. Readers should be aware that 
statistical significance is not the same as policy relevance. It may be reassuring to note a great degree 
of similarity in the observable student and teacher characteristics of the Chicago TAP and 
comparison groups, but that similarity is not necessary for unbiased estimation of the experimental 
impacts of Chicago TAP, because we control for observable differences through regression 
adjustment. What is required is that the groups be similar in terms of the unobserved determinants of 
student achievement growth and teacher retention, such as the level of motivation among students 
or teachers, which are not accounted for in the data. Properly implemented random assignment 
ensures that there should be no systematic differences between treatment and control groups in terms 
of observed or unobserved factors. Readers should exercise caution in interpreting the quasi-
experimental findings because these unobserved determinants of student achievement and teacher 
retention may be confounded with Chicago TAP status, leading to bias of unknown direction and 
magnitude. 
Table II.2 shows the balance across school groups in terms of student demographics and 
baseline test scores.13
We measured teacher characteristics using the teacher survey and CPS administrative records. 
In the survey sample, none of the differences between Chicago TAP and control group teacher 
characteristics (shown in Table II.3) was statistically significant. The only significant difference 
between Chicago TAP and the comparison group was the difference in the percentage of teachers 
who have a master’s degree or higher. 
 The only statistically significant difference between Chicago TAP schools 
(cohorts 1 and 3) and control schools (cohorts 2 and 4) was the difference in the percentage of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. We do not find any statistically significant 
differences between the combined Chicago TAP group (cohorts 1, 2, 3, and 4) and matched 
comparison schools. 
  
                                                 
13 These student characteristics are presented to illustrate the types of schools included in the study, but they are 
not identical to the characteristics of the students whose 2009–2010 school year test scores were analyzed. We tabulated 
statistics for those students from the impact analysis sample and found similar results to those presented here. 
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Using the administrative data sample, we found a few statistically significant differences 
between Chicago TAP and matched comparison schools in teacher characteristics (Table II.4). The 
percentage of teachers holding National Board certification was higher in Chicago TAP schools than 
in comparison schools. Chicago TAP schools had lower percentages of teachers in academic but 
nontested grades or subjects and late-career teachers (having more than 24 years of service in the 
district) than comparison schools. 























Race/Ethnicity        
African American 91.7 89.4 2.4  95.1 92.3 2.9 
Hispanic/Latino 7.3 9.2 -1.9  4.3 6.6 -2.3 
White 0.3 0.7 -0.4  0.4 0.7 -0.2 
Eligible for free/ 
reduced-price lunch 
97.3 94.1 3.3*  95.5 94.6 0.9 
Limited English 
proficient 
2.7 3.8 -1.1  1.0 1.5 -0.5 
Special education  
(has Individualized 
Education Program) 
13.3 14.4 -1.1  13.4 13.4 0.0 




       
ISAT Reading 213.3 211.0 2.2  211.0 211.6 -0.6 
ISAT Math 224.6 222.8 1.8  222.3 223.1 -0.8 
Note:  N = 5,176 cohort 1 and 3 students in 17 schools; 5,596 cohort 2 and 4 students in 17 
schools; 11,331 cohort 1, 2, 3, and 4 students in 39 schools; and 31,068 matched 
comparison students in 99 schools. Data for cohorts 3 and 4 pertain to the student body in 
the school during the 2008–2009 school year. Data for cohorts 1 and 2, for the combined 
Chicago TAP group (cohorts 1–4), and for matched comparison schools pertain to the student 
body in the schools during the 2006–2007 school year. 
   * Difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table II.3. Teacher Characteristics by School Type, 2009–2010 Survey Sample (percentages except 
where noted) 








to Cohort 3 






Master's degree or higher 75.5 73.3 65.3  2.2 10.2** 
Alternative certification 17.3 16.1 17.1  1.2 0.2 
National board certification 4.3 5.9 2.9  -1.6 1.4 
Taught tested subject/grade 38.3 44.5 38.4  -6.1 -0.1 
Experience (years) 11.9 13.0 12.8  -1.1 -0.9 
<5 years of experience 18.3 14.9 17.0  3.4 1.3 
Age (years) 41.3 42.1 43.6  -0.8 -2.3 
Male 9.4 12.4 15.4  -3.0 -6.0 
African American 66.1 53.9 53.7  12.3 12.4 
Hispanic/Latino 4.9 15.4 16.1  -10.4 -11.2 
Attended CPS as a student 56.2 58.2 58.3   -1.9 -2.1 
Note:  N = 140 cohort 3 teachers in 8 schools, 144 cohort 4 teachers in 8 schools, and 244 matched 
comparison teachers in 16 schools. 
   * Difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table II.4. Teacher Characteristics by School Group, 2009–2010, Administrative Data Sample 
(percentage unless otherwise noted) 







(to Cohorts 1–3) 
Mean Difference 
Master's degree or higher  66.8 62.5 4.3 
National Board certification  5.7 2.9 2.8* 
Taught academic subject, tested 
grade/subject 
 37.4 34.8 2.6 
Taught academic subject, 
nontested grade/subject 
 46.3 50.2 -4.0* 
Years of service  10.5 11.6 -1.1 
Percentage <5 years of service  31.2 26.8 4.4 
Percentage 5–24 years of service  62.6 64.5 -1.9 
Percentage >24 years of service  6.2 8.8 -2.6* 
Note:  N = 612 Chicago TAP teachers in 21 schools and 2,082 matched comparison teachers in 77 
schools. 
   * Difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 ** Difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 




In order to interpret the study’s impact estimates, it is important to understand what Chicago 
TAP schools implemented and how faithful they were to the Chicago TAP model. This chapter aims 
to address this question. We used district administrative records to describe teacher payouts. We also 
used district-supplied ratings of implementation fidelity, which were produced by reviewers who 
visited each Chicago TAP school, and summarized internal evaluation reports produced by CPS. 
The other source of information came directly from the teachers. We conducted two teacher 
surveys. The first, in spring 2008, asked teachers in new Chicago TAP schools (cohort 1) and non-
TAP schools (cohort 2/control and matched comparison) about their experiences with mentoring, 
professional development, and compensation. Our surveys also measured attitudes about factors 
that could be affected by Chicago TAP. We repeated the survey in spring 2010, focusing on teachers 
in the newest cohort of Chicago TAP schools (cohort 3) and their control group and a matched 
comparison group as well. 
A. Teacher Payouts, TAP Fidelity, and Teacher Attitudes 
1.  Payouts 
For performing their extra duties, mentor teachers receive an additional $7,000 per year and 
lead teachers an additional $15,000.14
Data provided to the authors by CPS suggest that the teacher payouts averaged less than the 
original target amounts (Table III.1). We found that the average performance bonus payout for a 
school’s first year of Chicago TAP implementation was approximately $1,100 per teacher in the first 
three years of district rollout (2007–2008, 2008–2009, and 2009–2010), rising to $1,400 for new 
Chicago TAP implementers in 2010–2011, with a maximum payout of less than $2,700 in any year. 
For a school’s second and third years of implementation, the average payout was approximately 
$2,500, with a maximum payout of $6,400, although in the fourth year of implementation, the 
average payout was lower, about $1,900 with a maximum less than $4,600. 
 Program documents indicate that in the first year of 
implementing Chicago TAP, the pool for teacher performance bonuses was supposed to support an 
average bonus of $2,000 per teacher based on value added to student achievement and observed 
classroom performance (Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union 2007; Chicago 
Public Education Fund n.d.). In subsequent years, the target average payout was supposed to rise to 
$4,000 per teacher. Principals can earn up to $5,000 each year based on the quality of program 
implementation and schoolwide value added. Other school staff can receive up to $500 in the first 
year and $1,000 in subsequent years based on schoolwide value added.  
Table III.1 shows the mean and range of teacher payouts under Chicago TAP, but another 
aspect of the teacher payout distribution is the degree to which the individual teacher performance 
determined payouts relative to schoolwide performance. If most of the variation occurs between 
schools rather than within schools, it suggests that Chicago TAP effectively offered school-level 
performance bonuses rather than individual teacher bonuses. To measure this variation, we 
                                                 
14 For the final year of program rollout, Chicago TAP added a “lead plus” position in which a lead teacher supports 
two other TAP schools in addition to his or her home Chicago TAP school. Lead plus teachers receive an additional 
$5,000 per year, for a total stipend of $20,000. 
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computed the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which can be interpreted as the proportion of 
variation in teacher payouts that occurs between schools relative to total variation (between and 
within schools). These ICCs are presented in Table III.2 by year and by cohort. An ICC of 1.0 
means that every teacher within each school had the same payout. An ICC of 0.0 means that average 
payouts were the same for all schools. We multiplied the ICCs by 100 so they can be read as 
percentages. The results suggest that more than two-thirds of the variation occurred between 
schools in the first year of rollout in the district (2007–2008), but the between-school percentage 
declined across years, with the exception of cohort 1 in the fourth year (2010–2011). In the final two 
years, most of the variation in payouts occurred within schools. 
Table III.1. Average Performance- Based Payouts Under Chicago TAP by Cohort and Year 
 School Group 
Year Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 
2007–08 
$1,078 
(Range = $0 to 
$2,045) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008–09 
$2,622 
(Range = $0 to 
$6,320) 
$1,066 





 (Range = $0 to 
$6,123) 
$2,402 
(Range = $0 to 
$6,400) 
$1,091 





 (Range = $0 to 
$4,527) 
$2,478 
 (Range = $0 to 
$5,400) 
$2,480 
 (Range = $0 to 
$5,457) 
$1,409 
 (Range = $0 to 
$2,675) 
Note:  Data pertain to CPS elementary schools; N =  5–10 schools in each cohort/year table cell. Shading 
of the cells represents the number of years implementing Chicago TAP ranging from 1 year 
(lightest) to 4 years (darkest). 
n.a. = not applicable. 
Table III.2. Percentage of Variation in Teacher Payouts Occurring Between Chicago TAP Schools, by 
Cohort and Year 
 School Group 
Year Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 
2007–08 70 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008–09 17 55 n.a. n.a. 
2009–10 15 34 38 n.a. 
2010–11 31 23 28 28 
Note:  Data pertain to CPS elementary schools; N=5–10 schools in each cohort/year cell. Each number is 
an intraclass correlation statistic, representing the percentage of variation between schools, with 
the remaining percentage being within schools. Shading of the cells represents the number of years 
implementing Chicago TAP ranging from 1 year (lightest) to 4 years (darkest). 
n.a. = not applicable. 
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The student achievement component of teacher performance-based payouts was originally 
supposed to be based on schoolwide value added in a school’s first program implementation year 
and a combination of schoolwide and classroom-level value added in subsequent years (Chicago 
Public Education Fund n.d.). In practice, however, the classroom-level value-added component was 
not implemented. Only school-level value added was used in the first two years of district rollout 
(2007–2008 and 2008–2009). Starting with the third rollout year (2009–2010), CPS used school- and 
school-grade level value added in calculating performance bonuses for teachers in schools that were 
in their second or later year of program implementation. According to Chicago TAP staff, CPS did 
not implement the classroom-level value-added component because the data that were needed to 
reliably link students and teachers at the classroom level were not available. 
2.  Program Review Scores (TAP Fidelity Ratings) 
Every spring, NIET conducts site visits to TAP schools to verify that they are implementing the 
program according to the organization’s standards. Schools are rated along several dimensions and 
given a summary score (“cumulative program review score”) that describes their implementation. 
The average scores by year and cohort are shown in Table III.3. In the first two years of rollout, 
NIET gave the Chicago TAP schools in this study an average score of approximately 3 on a five-
point scale, where a 5 represents “the fullest, most complete, and high quality level of 
implementation,” according to program review reports supplied by CPS to the authors. NIET 
program review scores averaged 2.7 in the third rollout year. 
During the summer following the third rollout year (August 2010), NIET informed CPS that 
the district had not implemented the TAP system. NIET indicated that elements of TAP had been 
introduced, but TAP implementation had not been “rigorous,” according to a letter supplied by 
NIET to the authors.  
For the final year of rollout, CPS staff, rather than NIET, conducted the program reviews. 
During that year the average scores were nearly two points higher than in the previous year, as 
shown in Table III.3.  
3.  Teacher Attitudes Reported in CPS Evaluation Reports 
CPS conducted an internal evaluation of Chicago TAP aimed at providing formative feedback 
to program staff. The year 1 evaluation report (Foster 2009) used teacher surveys and focus groups 
to describe perceptions of the program among staff in Chicago TAP schools during the 2007–2008 
school year and to document the degree to which staff found the program helpful and implemented 
it faithfully. The study reported that teachers generally had positive perceptions of Chicago TAP but 
it raised concerns about the communication of program structure and expectations. The majority of 
teachers participated in the cluster activities that focused on teaching them new skills (through, for 
example, a demonstration by an expert teacher or feedback from a colleague or mentor). The CPS 
implementation study also found that teachers reported Chicago TAP coaching to be more frequent 
than coaching offered in the year prior to implementation, and that the professional development 
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Table III.3. Average Program Review Score by Cohort and Year 
 School Group 
Year Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 
2007–08a 2.9 (Range = 2.5 to 3.4) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008–09a 3.1 (Range = 2.2 to 3.8) 
3.2 
(Range = 2.8 to 3.7) 
n.a. n.a. 
2009–10a 2.5 (Range = 1.9 to 3.3) 
2.8 
(Range = 2.0 to 3.5) 
2.6 
(Range = 2.2 to 3.0) 
n.a. 
2010–11b 4.5 (Range = 3.5 to 5.0) 
4.4 
(Range = 2.7 to 5.0) 
4.7 
(Range = 3.7 to 5.0) 
4.5 
(Range = 3.2 to 5.0) 
Note:  Data pertain to CPS elementary schools; N=5–10 schools in each cohort/year cell. Shading of 
the cells represents the number of years implementing Chicago TAP ranging from 1 year 
(lightest) to 4 years (darkest).  
n.a. = not applicable. 
a Program reviews were conducted by NIET. 
b Program reviews were conducted by CPS. 
In a follow-up year 3 study (Crown 2010), CPS reported a generally favorable teacher reaction 
to Chicago TAP implementation, with more enthusiasm for professional development and less for 
performance-based pay. The study found that teachers in TAP schools “assign favorable ratings to 
the impact of TAP on their schools and their teaching.” The study cited coaching, training, and 
support as the key to Chicago TAP’s success. Teachers reported that cluster group meetings occur 
weekly as planned and last at least 45 minutes in “most, but not all” Chicago TAP schools. Chicago 
TAP teachers were found to “overwhelmingly” endorse the observation and coaching system, which 
they found “very useful.” However, performance-based pay was seen to have “a minimal impact on 
how teachers view their jobs, and a moderate impact on teachers’ motivation to improve their 
performance.” According to the teacher survey, the first two cohorts of Chicago TAP teachers 
identified both improvements and challenges over time, and expressed the view that it takes time for 
the program to become established. 
The current study differs from the NIET and CPS efforts to measure implementation in that it 
incorporates data from non-TAP schools to provide additional context. This practice allows us to 
describe implementation and impacts relative to the norm for the district or for district schools that 
might have implemented Chicago TAP but did not.  
B. Implementation in Chicago TAP and Non- TAP Schools Based on 
Teacher Surveys 
To assess the first year under Chicago TAP for the most recent cohort of schools to begin the 
program, we compared how teacher development and compensation practices in Chicago TAP 
schools differ from practices normally implemented in CPS schools. For Chicago TAP, or 
“treatment,” schools, we used cohort 3 schools, which were randomly assigned to begin the 
program in fall 2009; for non-TAP, or “control,” schools, we used cohort 4 schools, which were 
randomly assigned to delay implementation of the program until fall 2010. Using specific practices as 
outcomes, we calculated regression-adjusted means for the treatment and control schools. The 
control school means enabled us to characterize the counterfactual condition—that is, the 
experiences that would have occurred in the absence of Chicago TAP. We performed t-tests to 
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assess the extent to which practices in Chicago TAP schools differed significantly from practices in 
non-TAP schools. Similar findings were obtained when we compared practices in cohort 3 schools 
to practices in a matched comparison sample of non-TAP schools. Those results are presented in 
Appendix B (Tables B.1–B.7). Results for an earlier administration of the survey, conducted in 2008 
with cohorts 1 (Chicago TAP), 2 (control), and a matched comparison group, were largely similar to 
those presented here. Those findings can be seen in an earlier report from this study (Glazerman et 
al. 2009). 
1. Mentoring, Leadership, and Feedback 
Overall, we found mentoring, leadership, and feedback in both Chicago TAP and non-TAP 
schools, but Chicago TAP schools tended to provide more mentoring support for teachers. 
Compared to control teachers, treatment teachers reported spending more time receiving guidance 
from an advisor. Veteran teachers in treatment schools were more likely than veteran teachers in 
control schools to provide mentoring support for other teachers. Observation and feedback were 
generally about as common in non-TAP as in Chicago TAP schools. 
a. Mentoring Received 
Chicago TAP incorporates mentoring into the regular school day through ongoing classroom 
support provided by master teachers (known as lead teachers in Chicago) and mentor teachers. 
Teachers meet weekly in small cluster groups led by lead or mentor teachers; the goal of these 
meetings is for teachers to collaborate on improving their instruction and increasing student 
achievement. Mentor teachers are also assigned specific traditional-classroom teachers whose 
professional development they are meant to foster (NIET 2008). 
According to teachers, mentoring was prevalent in both Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools 
(see Table III.4). Treatment teachers were more likely than control teachers to report having at least 
one advisor from whom they received professional advice and direct assistance with their teaching 
duties, but the difference was not statistically significant. We did, however, find several other 
meaningful differences suggesting that teachers in Chicago TAP schools received significantly more 
mentoring support than teachers in non-TAP schools. 
There were significant differences in the type of individuals from whom teachers receive advice 
and assistance. Compared to control teachers, treatment teachers were more likely to receive 
guidance from an individual they characterized as a mentor, a lead teacher, or a principal. Eighty-six 
percent of treatment teachers indicated that their main advisor worked only in their school, 
compared to 66 percent of control teachers. Having a mentor in the building, which is the aim of the 
Chicago TAP model, might provide more opportunities for assistance on demand than having 
itinerant mentors. The main advisors of treatment teachers were also significantly more likely to be 
full-time teachers and to receive release time from classroom teaching in order to perform their 
mentoring duties. These findings are consistent with the Chicago TAP model, in which mentor and 
lead teachers are given release time to work with traditional-classroom teachers in their schools. 
Other significant differences relative to main advisors in control schools were that main advisors in 
Chicago TAP schools were less likely to be district specialists and more likely to be from a teacher 
licensing, certification, or preparation program. 
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Received professional advice and assistance in 
teaching duties from an advisor (percentage) 
96.7 85.6 11.1 7.68 
Had an advisor who was a(n)  . . . (percentage)     
Mentor 56.9 10.9 46.0*** 4.74 
Literacy coach 46.2 61.5 -15.3 13.74 
Math coach 24.2 29.7 -5.5 14.01 
Lead teacher 77.2 9.0 68.2*** 4.53 
Principal 63.9 33.9 30.0*** 8.08 
Assistant or vice principal 48.8 34.6 14.1 11.22 
Peer 42.1 33.8 8.3 6.85 
Had a main advisor who was a . . . (percentage)     
Full-time teacher 60.5 37.5 23.0*** 7.00 
Person who works in teacher’s school only 85.6 65.9 19.6** 8.31 
Person who works in more than one school 4.9 13.6 -8.8** 3.56 
Teacher with release time 44.5 26.1 18.4*** 6.49 
Person with no classroom teaching 60.7 58.5 2.3 11.08 
Principal or school administrator 18.0 22.7 -4.7 5.23 
School-based specialist 43.5 43.6 -0.1 10.30 
District specialist 3.3 10.3 -7.0 3.87 
Person from a teacher licensing, certification, or 
preparation program 
22.9 17.5 5.3 3.17 
Time spent with main advisor     
Frequency of scheduled meetings (number per 
week) 
1.4 0.9 0.5** 0.19 
Duration of each scheduled meeting (minutes) 68.2 39.2 29.0*** 6.83 
Duration of informal contact (minutes per week) 79.0 51.6 27.5* 14.66 
Frequency of total contact (minutes per week) 178.7 95.9 82.7*** 22.72 
During most recent full week, scheduled time 
main advisor spent . . . (minutes) 
    
Observing teacher’s teaching 28.0 18.6 9.4** 4.37 
Meeting with teacher one-on-one 27.9 17.1 10.8** 4.95 
Meeting with teacher together with other 
teachers 
43.5 28.8 14.7* 7.10 
Modeling a lesson 20.6 6.4 14.2*** 3.53 
Coteaching a lesson 10.8 5.9 4.9 3.42 
Teacher received useful feedback from main 
advisor (percentage) 
88.1 85.9 2.2 4.87 
Note:  N = 247 to 283 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Teachers in Chicago TAP schools reported more frequent and longer meetings and activities 
with their main advisor. On average, treatment teachers had 1.4 scheduled meetings per week with 
their main advisor compared to 0.9 scheduled meetings per week for control teachers, with the 
average meeting for treatment teachers lasting 29 minutes longer. Both one-on-one and small-group 
meetings with main advisors were longer for treatment teachers than control teachers during the 
most recent full week of teaching. Compared to control teachers, treatment teachers also spent more 
scheduled time in the most recent full week being observed teaching by their main advisor and 
having their main advisor model a lesson. Chicago TAP also increased the amount of informal 
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contact teachers had with their main advisor, with treatment teachers reporting nearly 30 more 
minutes of informal contact per week than control teachers. In total, Chicago TAP teachers 
averaged nearly three hours of scheduled and informal contact with their main advisor per week, 
compared to an average of 96 minutes of total contact per week for control teachers.  
Both Chicago TAP and non-TAP teachers tended to regard the feedback they received from 
their main advisor as useful. Eighty-eight percent of treatment teachers and 86 percent of control 
teachers reported receiving useful feedback, a difference that was not statistically significant. 
b. Leadership Roles Held 
Chicago TAP offers teachers opportunities to take on leadership responsibilities and earn extra 
pay without having to leave the classroom entirely. Teachers can become mentor or lead teachers 
who serve on the Chicago TAP leadership team responsible for the overall implementation of 
Chicago TAP, analyze student data, and develop academic achievement plans. In addition, mentor 
and lead teachers support the professional development of traditional-classroom teachers, known as 
career teachers. Responsibilities of these teacher-leaders include leading cluster groups, observing 
and evaluating career teachers, team teaching with colleagues, and modeling lessons. Mentor 
teachers provide day-to-day mentoring and coaching to career teachers. Sharing leadership and 
authority with the principal, lead teachers are also responsible for overseeing the professional 
development of both mentor and career teachers (NIET 2008). 
Under the Chicago TAP model, mentor and lead teachers receive release time from classroom 
teaching in order to fulfill their leadership responsibilities. Chicago TAP schools are expected to 
provide mentor teachers with one to five hours of student-free time per week outside of cluster 
meetings. The model recommends that lead teachers teach two hours per day and devote the 
remainder of their work day to lead teacher responsibilities. 
Measuring the impact of lead and mentor teachers is complicated by the fact that these 
positions have no clear analogue in non-TAP schools. Therefore, our approach was to measure for 
each school the amount of leadership and mentoring provided by teachers who could plausibly have 
played similar roles as lead or mentor teachers. We focused on veteran teachers, whom we defined 
as having at least five years of experience as a head classroom teacher. This experience cutoff 
roughly approximates the minimum experience levels required to become mentor or lead teachers 
for the first year of Chicago TAP’s implementation. Chicago TAP requirements for these teacher-
leader roles include a minimum of four years of teaching experience for mentor teachers; lead 
teachers must have at least six years of successful teaching, with at least four years as a classroom 
teacher (NIET 2008). If one mentor teacher is assigned to each group of 8 career teachers, and one 
lead teacher is assigned to each group of 15 career teachers, then one might expect about 17 percent 
of all teachers to be providing leadership in a Chicago TAP school. When the sample is restricted to 
veteran teachers, one might expect the percentage to be higher. The goal of the analysis is to 
estimate that percentage for Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools. 
Consistent with the career path component of the Chicago TAP model, veteran teachers in 
Chicago TAP schools were more likely than their control group counterparts to provide mentoring 
support for other teachers in a range of topics (see Table III.5). Twenty-five percent of veteran 
Chicago TAP teachers reported providing “formal mentoring services” to teachers in their schools, 
compared to 15 percent of veteran control teachers. Though a variety of topics was covered in 
mentoring activities in both Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools, veteran Chicago TAP teachers 
were significantly more likely to report covering certain topics, such as devising strategies for 
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teaching literacy, setting instructional goals and determining ways to achieve them, and preparing 
lesson plans or other instructional activities.  








Provided formal mentoring services (percentage) 24.9 15.0 9.9** 4.38 
Mentoring topics included . . . (percentage)     
Strategies for teaching literacy 23.8 8.2 15.5*** 4.11 
Strategies for teaching math 10.6 5.3 5.3 2.80 
Strategies for teaching other subjects 11.7 8.6 3.1 4.43 
Increasing content area knowledge 16.3 10.4 5.9 4.64 
Selecting or adapting curriculum materials 16.8 6.7 10.1*** 3.21 
Teaching or aligning curriculum to meet state or 
district standards 
20.0 10.2 9.9** 4.22 
Aligning local curriculum assessment to state 
standards 
13.8 8.2 5.6 3.60 
Setting instructional goals and determining ways 
to achieve them 
21.8 10.5 11.3*** 4.33 
Preparing students for standardized tests 16.0 8.1 7.9* 4.37 
Using assessments to inform teaching 19.9 11.9 8.0** 4.07 
Preparing lesson plans or other instructional 
activities 
20.1 8.1 12.0*** 4.41 
Providing differentiated instruction to meet 
student needs 
19.4 10.1 9.3** 4.77 
Received release time for mentoring (percentage) 3.6 0.7 2.9*** 0.90 
Release time for mentoring (hours per week) 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.72 
Mentoring outside of specified contract hours  
(hours per week) 
1.8 0.8 1.1 0.71 
Teachers mentored (number) 2.2 0.8 1.3** 0.50 
Frequency of scheduled meetings  
(number per week per teacher) 
0.3 0.3 0.0 0.12 
Duration of each scheduled meeting (minutes) 13.9 7.6 6.3* 3.35 
Informal contact with all teachers (minutes per week) 68.0 38.0 29.9 28.19 
Total contact with all teachers (minutes per week) 182.9 43.1 139.7** 63.83 
Mentoring activities included . . . (percentage)     
Observing teaching 5.6 1.4 4.2*** 1.20 
Meeting with teachers one-on-one 24.2 9.9 14.3*** 4.52 
Meeting in small groups or clusters 4.9 1.5 3.4*** 0.91 
Modeling a lesson 24.0 6.5 17.5*** 5.06 
Coteaching a lesson 3.6 0.9 2.8*** 0.83 
Writing evaluations 17.5 3.5 14.1*** 5.20 
During most recent full week, scheduled time spent 
. . . (minutes) 
    
Observing teaching 39.7 41.4 -1.7 31.53 
Meeting with teachers one-on-one 37.2 19.2 18.0 11.16 
Meeting in small groups or clusters 32.5 15.2 17.3* 9.17 
Modeling a lesson 24.2 12.8 11.4 11.03 
Coteaching a lesson 16.9 8.0 8.8 8.36 
Writing evaluations 45.1 6.4 38.7** 13.74 
Note:  N=215 to 234 teachers per outcome 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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We also found significant differences in the time spent, and the specific activities conducted, as 
a mentor. Veteran Chicago TAP teachers were significantly more likely than veteran control teachers 
to receive release time from their regular professional duties to perform their mentoring, although 
the amount of release time received did not differ significantly between the two groups of teachers. 
Chicago TAP also affected the number of teachers mentored, with veteran Chicago TAP teachers 
mentoring about two teachers on average, compared to one teacher for veteran control teachers. 
Compared to veteran control teachers, veteran Chicago TAP teachers had longer scheduled 
meetings with each teacher on average and had more total contact each week with all the teachers 
they mentored. 
According to findings on mentoring activities, veteran Chicago TAP teachers were significantly 
more likely to have recently spent time meeting with teachers in small groups and writing 
evaluations. Compared to veteran control teachers, veteran Chicago TAP teachers spent on average 
17 more minutes of scheduled time during the most recent full week meeting in small groups or 
clusters, and 39 more minutes writing evaluations. We also found that veteran Chicago TAP teachers 
were more likely to observe other teachers, meet with teachers one-on-one, model a lesson, and 
coteach a lesson as part of their mentoring responsibilities, but none of the differences in scheduled 
time spent on these activities during the most recent week of full teaching was statistically 
significant. 
We found few significant differences between Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools in the 
percentage of veteran teachers having leadership roles or responsibilities other than those 
responsibilities like mentoring and observation that are explicitly part of the Chicago TAP model 
(see Table III.6).15
c. Observation and Feedback  
 Thirty-nine percent of veteran Chicago TAP teachers and 45 percent of veteran 
control teachers reported having such leadership tasks, a difference that was not statistically 
significant. Veteran Chicago TAP teachers were significantly more likely than veteran control 
teachers to serve as a lead teacher. We also found that veteran Chicago TAP teachers were more 
likely than control teachers to receive a pay increase in association with their nonmentoring 
leadership roles and responsibilities. Other reported differences in leadership roles and 
responsibilities, primarily in areas like governance and decision making, were not statistically 
significant.  
As part of establishing instructionally focused accountability, the Chicago TAP model calls for 
observations of teachers conducted by the Chicago TAP leadership team, which consists of the 
principal, lead teachers, and mentor teachers. During the first year of implementation, the program 
model allows for practice observations during the first semester and prescribes at least two official 
observations during the second semester; the official observations are used to determine 
performance-based compensation (Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union 2007; 
NIET 2008). 
                                                 
15 Readers should note that we conduct a large number of hypothesis tests, each of which has a probability of 
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference (denoted as the significance level, usually 5 percent). When 
conducting large numbers of hypothesis tests, it is likely that at least some relationships will appear “statistically 
significant” purely by chance. For example, at a 5 percent significance level, one in 20 independent test results will 
appear statistically significant even if there is no underlying relationship. Therefore, isolated significant results are 
suggestive but not conclusive evidence of a relationship. 
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We found that in Chicago TAP schools, there were more frequent observations by teachers in 
leadership roles than occurred in control schools (see Table III.7). During the 2009–2010 school 
year, a mentor, coach, or lead teacher observed teachers in treatment schools more than three times, 
on average; in control schools, there were about two observations by comparable teacher-leaders. 
However, the frequency of observations by school administrators was similar in the two groups. 
We did not find evidence that Chicago TAP affected how often teachers received feedback. In 
particular, there were no statistically significant differences between Chicago TAP and control 
teachers in how often they were given feedback in the following contexts: as part of a formal 
evaluation, outside of an evaluation, or specifically pertaining to lesson plans.16










Had other leadership roles or responsibilities beyond 
mentoring (percentage) 
39.3 44.7 -5.5 7.57 
Other leadership roles included . . . (percentage)     
Being a lead teacher 2.2 0.8 1.4*** 0.48 
Being a department head or chair 5.2 7.7 -2.5 2.46 
Being a grade-level lead teacher 8.6 13.0 -4.4 5.03 
Being on a school improvement team 15.6 20.9 -5.4 5.07 
Being on a schoolwide committee/task force 12.6 14.2 -1.6 6.32 
Other leadership responsibilities included . . . 
(percentage) 
    
Setting school policies 9.7 17.8 -8.1 6.80 
Developing curriculum 14.3 15.1 -0.8 4.19 
Reviewing/selecting curriculum 15.2 15.6 -0.4 5.73 
Providing input on improving facilities/technology 10.9 15.3 -4.4 5.91 
Providing professional development activities 20.5 17.3 3.2 4.83 
Developing standards 10.2 8.7 1.5 5.34 
Evaluating teachers 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.44 
Associated with these other leadership roles and 
responsibilities, received . . . (percentage) 
    
Credit toward certification 1.2 1.0 0.1 0.48 
Pay increase 16.1 1.5 14.6*** 5.06 
Note:  N = 228 to 232 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
  
                                                 
16 Responses were top-coded at five occurrences during the school year. 
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Frequency of observation (number in 2009–2010)     
Observation by principal or assistant principal 2.9 3.1 -0.1 0.32 
Observation by mentor, coach, or lead teacher 3.2 2.4 0.8* 0.39 
Frequency of feedback (number in 2009–2010)     
Feedback as part of a formal evaluation 2.5 2.3 0.2 0.25 
Feedback outside of a formal evaluation 2.6 2.3 0.3 0.27 
Feedback on lesson plans 2.2 2.5 -0.3 0.41 
Note:  N = 277 to 281 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
2. Professional Development 
Chicago TAP offers teachers “ongoing applied professional growth” through school-based 
professional development during the school day. Through weekly cluster meetings, as well as other 
interactions among lead and mentor teachers and career teachers, the program provides 
opportunities to collaborate on improving the quality of instruction and to learn new research-based 
instructional strategies for increasing academic achievement. 
We found few significant differences in professional development received by treatment and 
control teachers (see Table III.8). In both groups, most teachers participated in professional 
development activities addressing a range of topics. We did not find any statistically significant 
differences in topic areas covered.  
The majority of teachers in both groups characterized their professional development activities 
as useful and reported having incorporated what they learned into their teaching. A significantly 
higher percentage of treatment than control teachers reported being more satisfied with professional 
development in the 2009–2010 school year than in previous years. We did not find a pattern of 
significant differences between Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools in the extent to which teachers 
received compensation or benefits in association with professional development activities.  
The lack of impacts found for professional development suggests that cluster group meetings, 
which were an integral part of Chicago TAP, may have been characterized by teachers as mentoring 
and not as professional development. Alternatively, it may be the case that similar types of support 
were provided in schools that were not implementing Chicago TAP. 
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Participated in professional development activities 
that addressed . . . (percentage) 
    
Strategies for teaching literacy 98.9 99.5 -0.6 0.41 
Strategies for teaching math 83.3 76.8 6.6 5.74 
Strategies for teaching other subjects 66.1 65.4 0.6 6.06 
Increasing content area knowledge 87.4 84.5 2.9 4.97 
Selecting or adapting curriculum materials 67.4 69.2 -1.8 7.00 
Teaching or aligning curriculum to meet state or 
district standards 
81.4 78.1 3.3 5.52 
Aligning local or teacher-developed curriculum 
assessment to state standards 
70.2 71.4 -1.2 7.39 
Setting instructional goals and determining ways 
to achieve them 
78.2 80.7 -2.5 5.13 
Preparing students for standardized tests 70.2 71.0 -0.8 7.10 
Using assessments to inform teaching 88.8 89.2 -0.5 3.97 
Preparing lesson plans or other instructional 
activities 
77.4 77.1 0.4 6.08 
Providing differentiated instruction to meet 
student needs 
86.7 88.9 -2.3 3.40 
Responded that professional development in  
2009–2010 . . . (percentage) 
    
Was useful to their teaching 83.8 85.0 -1.2 5.15 
Was more satisfactory than in previous years 34.7 22.3 12.4** 5.35 
Had been implemented in their teaching 92.0 91.3 0.7 2.73 
In association with professional development, 
received . . . (percentage) 
    
Scheduled nonteaching time in contract year 83.2 72.1 11.1** 4.74 
Other release time from teaching 46.1 37.2 8.8 7.19 
Stipend 65.6 66.4 -0.8 7.32 
Fee reimbursement 19.0 18.7 0.2 5.78 
Travel or expense reimbursement 6.1 14.9 -8.8** 3.81 
Course credits toward certification 51.2 48.5 2.7 4.07 
Pay increase 25.5 20.5 5.1 4.87 
Recognition or higher ratings on an annual teacher 
evaluation 
24.2 19.3 4.8 6.40 
Note:  N = 270 to 283 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
3. Compensation 
The Chicago TAP model can affect teacher pay through two routes: (1) multiple career paths 
(bonuses for serving as mentor or lead teacher) and (2) performance-based compensation (bonuses 
for scoring high marks on classroom observations and/or classroom- and school-level value added). 
Chicago TAP lead and mentor teachers receive an additional $15,000 and $7,000, respectively, as 
compensation for assuming more responsibility. Performance-based compensation provides 
bonuses to teachers who demonstrate their skills through classroom evaluations and who increase 
their students’ academic achievement growth over the course of the year. In the first year of the 
program’s implementation, 25 percent of the performance award was to be based on teacher 
performance as assessed through classroom observations and 75 percent on schoolwide student 
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achievement growth. Payments were expected to average $500 per teacher based on classroom 
observations and up to $1,500 per teacher based on value added to student achievement growth 
(NIET 2008). 
At the time the teacher survey was administered, Chicago TAP teachers had not yet received 
performance bonuses from the program. We describe below teacher expectations about 
compensation.  
We found that teacher reports were consistent with the program having been implemented as 
intended. Consistent with Chicago TAP’s emphasis on multiple career paths, Chicago TAP teachers 
were significantly more likely than control teachers to expect additional compensation for leadership 
(see Table III.9). Nineteen percent of Chicago TAP teachers expected to receive additional pay for 
leadership roles and responsibilities, compared to 4 percent of control teachers. The average annual 
amount of leadership pay expected by Chicago TAP teachers exceeded that of non-TAP teachers by 
$1,412. 
We also found significant differences regarding nonleadership pay, with the largest differences 
occurring in areas emphasized by Chicago TAP. For a teacher incentive to work effectively, teachers 
must be aware that they are eligible to receive pay conditional on their performance. Seventy-eight 
percent of Chicago TAP teachers reported being eligible for additional compensation based on 
instructional performance or student achievement, compared to 14 percent of control teachers. 
Expectations of actually receiving such compensation differed as well: 44 percent of treatment 
teachers expected to receive additional compensation for instructional performance or student 
achievement growth, compared to 3 percent of control teachers. Differences in eligibility for and 
expectations of compensation for other nonleadership reasons were smaller and in most cases not 
statistically significant. 
The amount of nonleadership compensation expected differed significantly for Chicago TAP 
and non-TAP schools as well. On average, Chicago TAP teachers expected to receive an annual 
$871 as additional compensation for nonleadership reasons, compared to $180 in additional pay 
expected by control teachers.  
4.  Teacher Attitudes 
As a program offering performance-based pay, Chicago TAP can affect the climate of the 
school in many ways. It can create competition or jealousy, and thereby potentially undermine 
collegiality. Alternatively, it can build collegiality by rewarding the group’s performance, or improve 
morale by bringing colleagues together, either in shared activities or in the larger effort to implement 
a new program. To assess Chicago TAP’s effect on school climate, we included questions on the 
teacher survey about teachers’ satisfaction with and attitudes toward their school. 
Teacher survey responses suggested that Chicago TAP did not change school climate: the 
majority of teachers in both Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools reported collaborative, supportive 
environments (see Table III.10). Seventy-nine percent of Chicago TAP teachers and 83 percent of 
control teachers reported being satisfied with the supportive atmosphere among faculty and 
collaboration with colleagues. The majority of both groups agreed with the statement that their 
principal worked to create a sense of community at their school. In neither case was the difference 
between the groups statistically significant. 
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Academic-year base salary ($) 62,137 62,029 107 1,277.49 
Base salary included leadership compensation 
(percentage) 
12.4 11.0 1.4 3.91 
Additional compensation was expected for 
leadership (percentage) 
19.3 4.4 14.9*** 4.22 
Expected amount of additional compensation for 
leadership ($) 
1,767 355 1,412*** 383.23 
Eligible for additional nonleadership 
compensation (percentage) 
81.7 37.9 43.7*** 5.90 
Eligible for additional nonleadership 
compensation based on . . . (percentage) 
    
Instructional performance 71.7 11.0 60.7*** 7.34 
Student achievement growth 64.6 11.9 52.7*** 6.40 
Instructional performance or student 
achievement growth 
78.2 14.1 64.1*** 6.35 
Subject matter taught 19.2 10.2 9.0* 4.98 
Student population taught 13.2 10.5 2.7 3.74 
Professional development 32.5 32.2 0.2 6.06 
University courses taken 14.4 20.3 -5.9 5.08 
Expected or had received additional 
nonleadership compensation (percentage) 
53.9 13.6 40.3*** 5.44 
Expected or had received additional 
nonleadership compensation based on . . .  
(percentage) 
    
Instructional performance 35.8 2.4 33.5*** 5.81 
Student achievement growth 30.3 1.3 28.9*** 4.99 
Instructional performance or student 
achievement growth 
44.7 3.1 41.6*** 5.77 
Subject matter taught 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Student population taught 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Professional development 15.7 9.0 6.8* 3.91 
University courses taken 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Expected amount of additional nonleadership 
compensation ($) 
871 181 690*** 159.91 
Expected additional compensation from an 
outside job (percentage) 
11.0 4.6 6.4* 2.79 
Note:  N = 240 to 274 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
When we examined other teacher attitudes, we found few significant differences between 
Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools (see Table III.10). Treatment teachers were significantly more 
likely than control teachers to report being satisfied with their salary and benefits, and fewer 
treatment than control teachers agreed with the statement that their principal is strongly committed 
to shared decision making. But other differences were not statistically significant, and among both 
treatment and control teachers, positive attitudes about their principals and other aspects of teaching 
were prevalent. 
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Satisfied with . . .  (percentage)     
Supportive atmosphere/collaboration with 
colleagues 
78.6 83.2 -4.6 4.75 
Administration support 76.1 79.7 -3.6 7.21 
Policies/practices input 74.4 80.1 -5.7 6.07 
Classroom autonomy 88.6 86.2 2.4 4.24 
Professional development opportunities 87.9 85.9 2.0 3.53 
Caliber of colleagues 79.0 85.0 -6.1 5.37 
Salary and benefits 90.4 84.6 5.7** 2.35 
Leadership opportunities 79.0 80.6 -1.6 4.29 
School policies 72.7 72.1 0.6 5.31 
District policies 57.0 54.5 2.5 6.13 
Agreed that the principal . . .  (percentage)     
Works to create a sense of community 73.6 79.9 -6.3 7.17 
Is strongly committed to shared decision making 73.9 84.0 -10.2* 5.99 
Promotes parent/community involvement 85.8 86.4 -0.6 5.58 
Supports and encourages risk taking 71.6 70.8 0.8 6.84 
Is willing to make changes 88.7 87.3 1.4 2.99 
Strongly supports most changes 81.2 85.0 -3.8 4.49 
Encourages trying new instructional methods 88.7 88.8 0.0 4.48 
Note: N = 270 to 278 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
 
 This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
 35 
IV. IMPACTS ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 
According to CPS, Chicago TAP (2009) was designed to support and develop high-quality 
teaching, which in turn would boost student learning. Consequently, students’ ISAT scores are the 
main outcomes of interest for the study. We focus on tested grades and subjects: math and reading 
in grades four through eight as well as science in grades four and seven. We examined outcomes in 
each year of the program’s four-year rollout in the district. This chapter explains our findings.  
A.  Experimental Evidence 
As described in Chapter II, we used a lottery to assign schools randomly to either a treatment 
group, which would implement Chicago TAP right away, or a control group, which would delay 
implementation by one year. The random assignment design allowed us to generate unbiased 
estimates of the impact of Chicago TAP in the first year of implementation by comparing outcomes 
for the two groups. Tests were administered in March of each year. We ran two lotteries, one in 
spring 2007 assigning cohorts 1 and 2, and one in spring 2009 assigning cohorts 3 and 4. We 
combined data from spring 2008 pertaining to the schools assigned in the 2007 lottery with data 
from spring 2010 pertaining to schools assigned in 2009 to form our main experimental analysis data 
set. Thus the treatment group of schools implementing Chicago TAP consists of cohort 1 in 2008 
and cohort 3 in 2010, while the control group consists of schools in cohort 2 in 2008 and cohort 4 
in 2010. These groups are shown in Figure IV.1. The differences in these years between Chicago 
TAP and control schools represent the impacts as of spring of the first year of implementing 
Chicago TAP. 
Overall, we found that in March of the first year of implementation, test scores for students in 
Chicago TAP schools were statistically indistinguishable from those of students in control schools 
(Table IV.1). The observed differences were less than 3 percent of a standard deviation for math and 
reading, but for science the students in Chicago TAP schools scored nearly 4 ISAT points, or 14 
percent of a standard deviation, higher than students in control schools.17 However, the impact on 
science scores was estimated from a relatively small sample because science test data were not 
available before 2009 and the test was only administered in two grades (four and seven). Therefore, 
even an effect size of 0.14 is within the margin of error.18
                                                 
17 Standard deviations used to calculate effect sizes are derived from the distribution of the full sample for each 
outcome. The standard deviations for reading, math, and science were approximately 32, 35, and 31 points, respectively. 
Thus, a one-point ISAT difference translates into approximately 3 percent of a standard deviation, or 1.2 percentile 
points.  
  
18 For the test of whether the impact on science scores is different from zero the p-value, which is the probability 
of observing this result if the true impact were zero, was 0.117. Accordingly, a 90 percent confidence interval still 
includes zero (no impact). 
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Figure IV.1. Experimental Sample in First Year of Implementation 
 
As noted in Chapter II, each of the estimates is derived from a regression model in which we 
control for students’ prior-year achievement in both subjects (math and reading) and other factors 
that might be related to test scores. These include family poverty (eligibility for free/reduced-price 
lunch), special needs (whether an Individualized Education Program was in place), language 
(whether limited English proficient), race/ethnicity, grade level, and age (whether older than the 
normal age for a grade). We accounted for the clustering of students or teachers within schools by 
estimating robust standard errors. We refer to this as the benchmark regression model. Alternatives 
to the benchmark model are presented later in this chapter. 





Meana Impact Standard Error 
Effect 
Size 
Reading 221.3 221.0 0.3 0.7 0.01 
Math 233.4 234.3 -0.9 0.9 -0.03 
Science 204.3 200.4 3.7 2.3 0.14 
Notes: First-year outcomes measured in March. N = 7,661 students (reading), 7,656 students (math), 
1,717 students (science). Data for math and reading are from spring 2008 (cohorts 1 and 2) 
and from spring 2010 (cohorts 3 and 4). Science data are from spring 2010 only (cohorts 3 
and 4). Science scores were not available for 2008. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
Differences are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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We estimated the results separately by grade level and did not find any statistically significant 
impacts. The results, shown in Table IV.2, are based on students in grades four through eight 
because testing begins at the end of grade three and a pretest was required to estimate regression-
adjusted impacts. As with the full sample results, only the score differences on the science test were 
noticeable and those again were not statistically significant.  










Reading      
Grade 4 201.4b 200.8b 0.6 2.3 0.03 
Grade 5 211.1b 212.5b -1.4 1.1 -0.06 
Grade 6 223.5 221.3 2.1 1.8 0.09 
Grade 7 227.9 229.1 -1.2 1.5 -0.05 
Grade 8 238.4 236.9 1.4 0.9 0.08 
Math      
Grade 4 209.4 211.0 -1.6 2.1 -0.07 
Grade 5 219.9 222.5 -2.7 2.0 -0.11 
Grade 6 233.8 233.4 0.3 2.1 0.01 
Grade 7 242.9 243.9 -1.0 1.8 -0.04 
Grade 8 255.8 255.2 0.6 1.8 0.03 
Science      
Grade 4 188.4 184.7b 3.7 4.0 0.15 
Grade 7 218.7 214.7 3.9 2.7 0.18 
Note: First-year outcomes measured in March. N = 1,381 to 1,678 students per grade in math and 
reading, 840 to 876 students per grade in science. 
a Means are regression adjusted.  
b Average score is classified as “Below Standards.” All other scores are in the category “Meets Standards.” 
Differences are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Because the ISAT is vertically scaled, the scores should be higher for each grade level, and the 
scores within each grade can be compared to state-set criteria for whether the students are meeting 
standards for their grade. The average scores shown in Table IV.2 were in the category for “meets 
standards” for every grade and subject except reading in grades four and five (Chicago TAP and 
control schools) and science in grade four (in control schools only), which were below standards.19
We tested whether the experimental results were robust to different methods and assumptions. 
To test the sensitivity of the findings, we reestimated the test score impacts several times, with each 
new model making one change to the benchmark model used in Table IV.1. The sensitivity results 
are summarized in Tables IV.3, IV.4, and IV.5 for reading, math, and science scores, respectively. 
For the sensitivity tests, we estimated impacts with the following variations: separate pretest effects 
estimated by grade, a nonlinear relationship (quadratic and cubic) between pretest and posttest, a 
model controlling for pretest in the same subject (reading pretest for reading posttest and math 
pretest for math or science posttest) but not the “opposite” subject, use of limited or no covariates, 
outcomes standardized within grade by subtracting the districtwide mean and dividing by the 
  
                                                 
19 The range of scores that defines each category can be found in the 2011 guide to the ISAT issued by the state 
(Illinois State Board of Education 2010). 
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districtwide standard deviation, and use of a specification that treated the school effect as a random 
variable. One further variation for estimating impacts involved use of specifications that corrected 
for pretest measurement error in one of three ways: by calculating gain score as the posttest minus 
pretest and using that as the outcome instead of posttest; by using the opposite subject pretest as an 
“instrument” for the same subject pretest; and by using a measurement error correction method that 
accounted for test score reliability being less than 1.0 (since the true reliabilities were not known, we 
used 0.9 and 0.8). For the science results (Table IV.5), we did not estimate a gain model because the 
pretest was only available in a different subject, math. 











Benchmark 0.3 0.7 0.01 7,661 
Covariates     
Separate pretest effect by grade 0.6 0.8 0.02 7,661 
Pretest squared and cubed 0.2 0.9 0.01 7,661 
Omit math pretest 0.3 0.8 0.01 7,684 
No pretest: grades 3–8 1.0 0.9 0.03 10,065 
No pretest: grades 4–8 only 1.3 1.0 0.05 8,248 
Pretest only (no other covariates) 0.1 0.8 0.00 7,661 
Scores standardized within grade (z-score) 0.00 0.03 0.01 7,661 
Alternative variance estimation method     
Random effects (RE) 0.3 0.7 0.01 7,661 
RE with school characteristics 0.1 0.7 0.00 7,661 
Measurement error correction     
Instrumental variables  0.3 0.8 0.01 7,661 
Gain model -0.3 0.8 -0.02 7,684 
Errors-in-variables model, reliability = .9 0.1 0.8 0.01 7,684 
Errors-in-variables model, reliability = .8 -1.0 1.0 -0.04 7,684 
Note: First year outcomes measured in March. 
Differences are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Under these alternative models the reading and math impact estimates remain small and 
statistically insignificant. The science impact estimates, which were positive but insignificant in the 
benchmark model, become statistically significant under select alternative models (Table IV.5). 
Specifically, the manner in which we adjust for prior achievement has an influence on the size of the 
estimate. When we omitted a control for prior reading scores the impact estimate was closer to 5 
ISAT points, or 17 percent of a standard deviation, which is large enough to be statistically 
significant (in other words, too large to have been plausibly generated by chance). 
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Benchmark -0.9 0.9 -0.03 7,656  
Covariates     
Separate pretest effect by grade -0.6 1.0 -0.02 7,656  
Pretest squared and cubed -0.6 1.0 -0.02 7,656  
Omit reading pretest -0.8 0.9 -0.03 7,672  
No pretest: grades 3–8 0.1 1.2 0.00 10,071  
No pretest: grades 4–8 only 0.3 1.3 0.01 8,250  
Pretest only (no other covariates) -0.9 1.0 -0.03 7,656  
Scores standardized within grade (z-score) 0.00 0.03 -0.04 7,656  
Alternative variance estimation method     
Random effects (RE) -0.9 1.2 -0.03 7,656  
RE with school characteristics -1.2 1.2 -0.04 7,656  
Measurement error correction     
Instrumental variables -0.8 0.9 -0.03 7,656  
Gain model -0.7 1.0 -0.02 7,917  
Errors-in-variables model, reliability = .9 -1.0 0.9 -0.07 7,672  
Errors-in-variables model, reliability = .8 -2.0 2.1 -0.04 7,685  
Note: First-year outcomes measured in March. 
Differences are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 











Benchmark 3.7 2.3 0.14 1,717 
Covariates     
Separate pretest effect by grade 4.2 2.9 0.15 1,717 
Pretest squared and cubed 3.8 2.4 0.14 1,717 
Omit reading pretest 4.7* 2.4 0.17 1,723 
No pretest 5.4* 3.1 0.20 1,807 
Pretest only (no other covariates) 3.2 2.4 0.12 1,717 
Scores standardized within grade (z-score) 0.10 0.09 0.16 1,717 
Alternative variance estimation method     
Random effects (RE) 2.8 2.5 0.10 1,717 
RE with school characteristics 3.2 2.8 0.11 1,717 
Measurement error correction     
Instrumental variables  4.7* 2.4 0.17 1,717 
Errors-in-variables model, reliability = .9 4.7* 2.5 0.25 1,723 
Errors-in-variables model, reliability = .8 -2.0 2.4 -0.08 1,723 
Note: First-year outcomes measured in March. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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The findings above (Tables IV.1 through IV.5) focused on 2008 and 2010 only because those 
were the only years during which a randomized control group was not implementing Chicago TAP. 
Because standardized testing takes place in March of each year, seven months into the nine-month 
school year, the analysis necessarily focuses on just the first seven months of the first year of 
implementation, a period during which the schools might not have had a chance to fully implement 
and become accustomed to the program.  
To understand the longer-term effects of Chicago TAP, it was important to examine results 
from schools that had been implementing Chicago TAP for a longer period. The random 
assignment component of the study design does not allow for comparisons of Chicago TAP to non- 
Chicago TAP schools for longer periods of implementation because the control groups began 
implementing Chicago TAP in the second school year after their initial assignment.  
However, we did produce experimental comparisons of schools that had different amounts of 
experience implementing Chicago TAP at any point in time. We compared schools with one versus 
two years of implementation (cohort 1 versus cohort 2 in 2009 and cohort 3 versus cohort 4 in 
2011), with two versus three years of implementation (cohort 1 versus cohort 2 in 2010), and with 
three versus four years (cohort 1 versus cohort 2 in 2011). The results, shown in Table IV.6, suggest 
that there was no advantage associated with having spent one extra year implementing Chicago TAP 
in any of the three subjects tested. The only statistically significant finding was that math scores were 
lower for Chicago TAP schools in their second year of implementation than scores of Chicago TAP 
schools still in their first year, a difference of 1.6 ISAT points. 
Table IV.6. Effect of One Additional Year of Chicago TAP Implementation on March ISAT Scores 
Implementation 










Size Sample Size 
Second year vs. 
first yearb      
 
Reading 220.6 221.0 -0.5 0.6 -0.02 7695 
Math 234.4 236.0 -1.6* 0.9 -0.05 7680 
Science 203.1 204.0 -0.9 1.6 -0.03 1723 
Third year vs. second 
yearc      
 
Reading 220.8 220.5 0.3 1.1 0.01 3,123 
Math 234.7 235.5 -0.8 1.5 -0.03 3,131 
Science 200.1 199.4 0.7 3.0 0.03 1,227 
Fourth year vs. third 
yeard      
 
Reading 222.4 223.5 -1.2 1.1 -0.04 2,908 
Math 236.7 238.7 -2.0 1.5 -0.07 2,909 
Science 203.8 205.4 -1.6 2.4 -0.06 1,104 
Note: Outcomes measured in March of each year.  
a Means are regression adjusted. 
b “More Chicago TAP” means pertain to cohort 1 in 2009 and cohort 3 in 2011. “Less Chicago TAP” means 
pertain to cohort 2 in 2009 and cohort 4 in 2011.  
c “More” and “less” Chicago TAP means refer to cohorts 1 and 2, respectively, in 2010. 
d “More” and “less” Chicago TAP means refer to cohorts 1 and 2, respectively, in 2011. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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B. Quasi- Experimental Evidence 
All of the previous results are experimental, meaning that they focus on schools that had been 
randomly assigned to their Chicago TAP cohort status. Most of the results are focused on the period 
immediately following random assignment, even though the schools continued implementing 
Chicago TAP until 2010–2011. We also conducted quasi-experimental analyses that compared 
Chicago TAP schools to matched comparison schools that had not been assigned to implement 
Chicago TAP at all. Such an analytic approach allowed us both to take advantage of the more than 
300 additional schools in Chicago that could serve as potential points of comparison, and to make 
use of several years of data, rather than being constrained to the first year of Chicago TAP 
implementation. In order to account for the underlying differences between schools that choose to 
adopt Chicago TAP and those that do not, we used propensity score matching (see Chapter II and 
Appendix A for more detailed information on the methodology). 
Using a longitudinal data set with test scores from 2007–2008 to 2010–2011, we compared test 
scores of students in each Chicago TAP school in each year to test scores of students in matched 
comparison schools. This aspect of the study design is shown in Figure IV.2. The results are shown 
in Table IV.7.  
Figure IV.2. Quasi- Experimental Design 
 
Note:  Shading indicates years of experience implementing Chicago TAP, ranging from one year 
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Table IV.7. Summary of Quasi- Experimental Findings: Impacts on March ISAT Scores 
Model 















1.  Overall Chicago TAP effect -0.1 0.3  0.1  0.4 1.1 0.8 
2. Chicago TAP effects by year 
of implementation (school 
experience) 
           
First year (all four cohorts) -0.2  0.4  0.4  0.5  1.3  1.2 
Second year (cohorts 1–3) -0.1  0.5  -0.1  0.6  0.1  1.0 
Third year (cohorts 1 & 2) 0.4  0.6  0.2  0.8  1.9  1.7 
Fourth year (cohort 1) -0.7  0.9  -1.3  1.4  2.1  3.6 
3. Chicago TAP effects by school year  
(district experience) 
          
Year 1: 2007–2008 (cohort 
1) 
-0.6  0.8  0.2  1.1  NA  NA 
Year 2: 2008–009 (cohorts 1 
& 2) 
-0.4  0.6  0.3  0.9  -0.4  1.7 
Year 3: 2009–2010 (cohorts 
1–3) 
1.3*  0.7  1.0  0.9  1.6  1.9 
Year 4: 2010–2011 (all four 
cohorts) 
-0.7  0.5  -0.5  0.7  0.3  1.2 
4. Chicago TAP effects by 
cohort 
           
Cohort 1 (all four years) -0.4  0.4  -0.4  0.6  1.7  1.6 
Cohort 2 (2009-2011) 0.5  0.5  1.2*  0.6  0.7  1.0 
Cohort 3 (2010-2011) 0.3  0.6  -0.4  0.7  1.3  1.4 
Cohort 4 (2011 only) -1.6***  0.6  -0.1  1.0  0.0  1.8 
Sample size (student-year 
combinations) 
83,214      83,125      29,364    
Sample size (school-grade-year 
combinations) 
2,092     2,092      764    
Note:  Analyses use nearest-five-neighbors matching. NA = data not available. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The top row of Table IV.7 provides the summary results and suggests that the overall 
differences between Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools are statistically insignificant for reading, 
math, and science. We also estimated the relationship between Chicago TAP implementation and 
test scores by year of implementation (model 2), to test the hypothesis that as schools spend more 
time implementing Chicago TAP they will be more successful. These results do not support such a 
hypothesis. The impact on reading, for example, is less than one ISAT point and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero whether the school had been implementing Chicago TAP for one, two, 
three, or four years. For math and science, the impact estimates were also statistically insignificant 
for any level of school experience with Chicago TAP. The point estimates are larger (positive and 
negative) for more years of implementation, but these effects are based on one or two cohorts of 
schools and are likely due to chance because they are not statistically significant. 
We also tested the hypothesis that Chicago TAP becomes more effective as the district overall 
has more experience implementing it (Table IV.7, model 3). In 2007, the district had just hired new 
staff to implement Chicago TAP in the first 10 schools. By 2011, the program had been 
implemented in more than 40 schools in the district. If the program had become more effective over 
time, the impacts would become stronger in later years. The results show that impacts were largest in 
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the third year, 2009– 2010, with the estimate being significant for reading (1.3 ISAT points, which is 
equivalent to 5 percent of a standard deviation) and insignificant for math and science. The 
estimated science effect was 1.7 ISAT points, but because science tests were taken only by fourth- 
and seventh-grade students and the scores were available only in 2009 and later, the estimate was 
based on a smaller sample, which makes it more difficult to detect an impact unless it is very large. A 
standard error of 1.9 points suggests that the impact estimate would have to have been larger than 
three points for it to be considered statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Before having seen the data, we predicted that test score impacts of Chicago TAP would grow 
over time for schools and for the district as a whole (Glazerman et al. 2007), but we showed above 
that schools with more years implementing Chicago TAP did not demonstrate higher test scores 
than those with fewer years of experience, and that impact estimates for the fourth year of rollout 
for the district (2010–2011) were lower than for the third year (2009–2010). A possible explanation 
for these results might be the strengths or weaknesses of the particular schools that happened to be 
part of each cohort implementing the program. To test this explanation, we estimated impacts 
separately by cohort, taking into account every year for which a given cohort was implementing 
Chicago TAP. These results are also presented in Table IV.7 (model 4), which suggests that the 
Chicago TAP effect was not statistically significant for 10 of the 12 hypothesis tests conducted. The 
two exceptions were the estimated impact on reading scores for cohort 4, which was negative (-1.6 
points), and on math scores for cohort 2, which was positive (1.2 points). The lack of a clear pattern 
suggests that despite these two exceptions, there was no obvious cohort effect that drives the results. 
Tables IV.8 through IV.10 demonstrate the degree to which the quasi-experimental findings are 
robust to alternative matching methods. We used several methods, but present results for two 
alternatives, discussed in Chapter II. One alternative, called caliper matching, selects all potential 
comparison schools whose predicted probability of being a Chicago TAP school (propensity score) 
is within a certain distance (radius) of an actual Chicago TAP school’s propensity score. We report 
results for one particular caliper size (radius), namely 0.025. Results for other radii are available from 
the authors. The other method, called kernel density estimation, selects every potential matching 
school, but assigns weights to each school according to the distances between that school and each 
Chicago TAP school in terms of their propensity score.  
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Table IV.8. Sensitivity of Quasi- Experimental Findings to Matching Method: Impacts on ISAT Reading 
Scores 















1. Overall Chicago TAP effect -0.1  0.3  -0.1  0.3  -0.2  0.3 
2.  Chicago TAP effects by year of  
implementation  
(school experience) 
        
First year (all four cohorts) -0.2  0.4  -0.2  0.4  -0.3  0.4 
Second year (cohorts 1–3) -0.1  0.5  -0.2  0.5  -0.3  0.5 
Third year (cohorts 1& 2) 0.4  0.6  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.6 
Fourth year (cohort 1) -0.7  0.9  -0.7  0.9  -0.7  0.9 
3.  Chicago TAP effects by school  
year (district experience) 
          
Year 1: 2007–2008  
(cohort 1) 
-0.6  0.8  -0.6  0.7  -0.4  0.7 
Year 2: 2008–2009  
(cohorts 1 & 2) 
-0.4  0.6  -0.6  0.6  -0.8  0.6 
Year 3: 2009–2010  
(cohorts 1–3) 
1.3*  0.7  1.4**  0.6  1.4**  0.6 
Year 4: 2010–2011  
(all four cohorts) 
-0.7  0.5  -0.7*  0.4  -0.8*  0.4 
4. Chicago TAP effects by 
cohort 
           
Cohort 1 (all four years) -0.4  0.4  -0.4  0.4  -0.5  0.4 
Cohort 2 (2009–2011) 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.5 
Cohort 3 (2010–2011) 0.3  0.6  0.3  0.6  0.3  0.6 
Cohort 4 (2011 only) -1.6***  0.6  -1.6***  0.6  -1.7***  0.6 
Sample size (student-year 
combinations) 
83,214     415,105     417,857    
Sample size (school-grade-
year combinations) 
2,092     7,834     7,893    
Note:  NN5 = nearest five neighbors. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
In terms of overall effects of Chicago TAP across all years and cohorts (model 1 in each table), 
the alternative matching methods produced the same findings for math and reading—no significant 
impacts of Chicago TAP. The overall impact of Chicago TAP on science scores, however, was 
positive and significant for one of the matching methods; for caliper matching, the impact was 1.5 
ISAT points, equal to about 5 percent of a standard deviation, or two percentile points from the 
median score (e.g., the difference between the 50th and 52nd percentile). For the other matching 
method (kernel density estimation), the impact estimate was slightly smaller and not significant.  
Both the caliper and kernel density estimators appear to use more data (larger sample) than the 
original matching method, but the tradeoff is that they may use schools that are not as closely 
matched. When we used a smaller radius of caliper to match schools—in other words, restricted the 
analysis to better matches—the results were similar to the large-radius results, with nonsignificant 
math and reading impacts, but a significant science impact of 1.7 ISAT points or 1.8 points, both 
significant at the 10 percent level. The smaller-radius caliper matches produced closer matches, but 
to use these approaches we had to drop some Chicago TAP schools from the analysis altogether 
because no non-TAP schools matched to them. For space reasons, these additional results are not 
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shown in the table. We based our choice of the nearest-five-neighbors method on the quality of 
match observed prior to examining any outcomes. See chapter II and Appendix A for more detail. 
In terms of the school experience (model 2), district experience (model 3), and cohort-specific 
effects (model 4), the inferences drawn in terms of the effects’ sign (positive or negative) and 
statistical significance were all the same regardless of matching method used, with just the two 
exceptions mentioned above.  
For reading scores (Table IV.8), the estimated impact in year 4 was slightly more precisely 
estimated using the caliper matching method, and the point estimate was slightly higher using the 
kernel density matching method; the impact therefore becomes statistically significant at the 10 
percent level for both (impact = -0.7 and -0.8, respectively).  
For math scores (Table IV.9), the year 3 Chicago TAP effect, which was not significant under 
the benchmark model with nearest-five-neighbors matching, becomes positive and statistically 
significant (impact = 1.8) using a caliper of 0.025. All of the other conclusions in terms of sign and 
statistical significance are the same.  
Table IV.9. Sensitivity of Quasi- Experimental Findings to Matching Method: Impacts on ISAT Math 
Scores 















1. Overall Chicago TAP effect 0.1  0.4 0.1 0.3  0.0  0.4 
2. Chicago TAP effects by year of  
implementation  
(school experience) 
        
First year (all four cohorts) 0.4  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.5 
Second year (cohorts 1–3) -0.1  0.6  0.0  0.6  -0.1  0.6 
Third year (cohorts 1 & 2) 0.2  0.8  0.4  0.8  0.3  0.8 
Fourth year (cohort 1) -1.3  1.4  -1.3  1.4  -1.3  1.4 
3. Chicago TAP effects by school year  
(district experience) 
          
Year 1: 2007–2008 (cohort 1) 0.2  1.10  -0.7  1.0  -0.8  1.0 
Year 2: 2008–2009 (cohorts 1 & 2) 0.3  0.85  -0.2  0.8  -0.1  0.8 
Year 3: 2009–2010 (cohorts 1–3) 1.0  0.93  1.8**  0.8  1.4  0.9 
Year 4: 2010–2011 (all four 
cohorts) 
-0.5  0.66  -0.7  0.6  -0.6  0.6 
4. TAP effects by cohort            
Cohort 1 (all four years) -0.4  0.6  -0.5  0.5  -0.6  0.5 
Cohort 2 (2009–2011) 1.2*  0.6  1.3**  0.6  1.1*  0.6 
Cohort 3 (2010–2011) -0.4  0.7  -0.2  0.7  -0.3  0.7 
Cohort 4 (2011 only) -0.1  1.0  -0.2  0.9  -0.2  0.9 
Sample size (student-year 
combinations) 
83,125     414,438     417,190    
Sample size (school-grade-year 
combinations) 
2,092     7,831     7,890    
Note:  NN5 = nearest five neighbors. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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For science scores, the overall Chicago TAP effect was statistically significant when we used the 
caliper matching methods, as discussed above, but the more detailed findings did not change. None 
of the school experience effects, district experience effects, or cohort effects was statistically 
significant using any of the matching methods. Following the same format as that of the previous 
two tables, Table IV.10 shows results for three of those matching methods, including the 
benchmark model (five nearest neighbors), caliper matching with a radius of 0.025, and kernel 
density matching. 
Table IV.10. Sensitivity of Quasi- Experimental Findings to Matching Method: Impacts on ISAT 
Science Scores 












1. Overall Chicago TAP effect 1.1 0.8  1.5** 0.7  1.1 0.7 
2.  Chicago TAP effects by year of  
implementation  
(school experience) 
     
First year (all four cohorts) 1.3 1.2  1.7 1.1  1.3 1.1 
Second year (cohorts 1–3) 0.1 1.0  0.5 0.9  0.1 0.9 
Third year (cohorts 1 & 2) 1.9 1.7  2.4 1.6  1.9 1.6 
Fourth year (cohort 1) 2.1 3.6  2.5 3.6  2.1 3.6 
3.  Chicago TAP effects by school year  
(district experience) 
       
Year 1: 2007–2008 (cohort 1) NA NA  NA NA    NA NA 
Year 2: 2008–2009 (cohorts 1 & 2) -0.4 1.7  -0.3 1.5  0.0 1.5 
Year 3: 2009–2010 (cohorts 1–3) 1.6 1.9  1.6 1.6  1.4 1.7 
Year 4: 2010–2011 (all four cohorts) 0.3 1.2  0.7 1.1  0.4 1.1 
4.  Chicago TAP effects by cohort         
Cohort 1 (all four years) 1.7 1.6  2.2 1.6  1.8 1.6 
Cohort 2 (2009–2011) 0.7 1.0  1.1 0.9  0.7 1.0 
Cohort 3 (2010–2011) 1.3 1.4  1.6 1.3  1.2 1.3 
Cohort 4 (2011 only) 0.0 1.8  0.4 1.8  0.0 1.8 
Sample size (student-year combinations) 29,364    125,315    125,984   
Sample size (school-grade-year 
combinations) 
764    2,376    2,390   
Note:  NN5 = nearest five neighbors. NA = data not available. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Finally, we tested the sensitivity of our findings to choice of a particular regression model. We 
reestimated the overall quasi-experimental Chicago TAP effects using a variety of different 
regression models, each of which makes slightly different assumptions about the control variables, 
or defines the study sample a bit differently. These are the same robustness tests used for the 
experimental findings presented in Tables IV.3–IV.5. The results, presented in Table IV.11, show 
that the findings reported in the summary table are robust. That is, we confirmed the lack of 
detectable impacts on reading, math, and science scores. 
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Table IV.11. Sensitivity of Quasi- Experimental Results to Model Specification: Impacts on ISAT Scores by Subject 





















Benchmark -0.1 0.3 83,214  0.1 0.4 83,125 1.1 0.8 29,364 
Covariates               
Separate pretest effect by grade -0.2  0.3 83,214  0.0  0.4 83,125  0.6  1.0 29,364 
Separate pretest effect by year 0.0  0.3 83,214  0.3  0.4 83,125  1.0  0.8 29,364 
Separate pretest effect by year 
and grade 
-0.1  0.5 83,214  0.1  0.6 83,125  0.5  1.0 29,364 
Pretest squared and cubed -0.1  0.3 83,214  0.0  0.4 83,125  1.0  0.8 29,354 
Scores standardized within grade 0.0  0.0 83,214  0.0  0.0 521,234  0.0  0.0 159,250 
No opposite subject pretest 0.0  0.3 83,214  0.0  0.4 83,429  0.8  0.8 29,464 
No pretest, grades 4–8 0.0  0.4 89,070  0.2  0.6 89,101  0.6  1.0 31,262 
No pretest, grades 3–8 -0.4  0.4 108,703  -0.2  0.6 108,711  NA  NA NA 
No covariates -0.1  0.3 83,214  0.0  0.4 83,125  1.0  0.8 29,364 
Alternative variance estimation 
method 
              
Random effects (RE) 0.0  0.3 83,214  0.0  0.3 83,125  1.2  0.7 29,364 
RE with school characteristics -0.1  0.3 83,214  0.0  0.3 83,125  1.1  0.7 29,364 
Measurement error correction               
Instrumental variables 0.0  0.3 83,214  0.0  0.4 83,125  0.8  0.8 29,364 
Errors in variables model, 
reliability = .9 
0.0  0.3 83,499  0.0  0.4 83,429  not estimated 
Errors in variables model, 
reliability = .8 
0.2  0.7 83,614  not estimated not estimated 
Note: Analyses use nearest-five-neighbors matching. Sample sizes are given in student-years. NA = data not available. 
Differences are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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C. Reconciling the Experimental and Quasi- Experimental Evidence 
As discussed in Chapter II, the experimental findings have the advantage of eliminating any 
systematic bias but the disadvantage of capturing only the first year of Chicago TAP 
implementation. Meanwhile, the quasi-experimental findings, which do capture the entire Chicago 
TAP experience, require us to assume that we have measured all of the important factors that are 
related to both Chicago TAP implementation and test score outcomes. 
Recognizing these limitations, we built into the study design an overlap, where we can compare 
outcomes for the randomized control group directly to outcomes for the matched comparison 
group. If the matching produces outcomes similar to those produced by the randomization, then we 
can be more confident in the quasi-experimental findings, which capture the full range of Chicago 
TAP implementation experiences. Figure IV.3 illustrates how this comparison fits into the overall 
study design. 
Table IV.12 shows the results of estimating the regression-adjusted difference in outcomes 
between the control group and the corresponding comparison group, each of which is being used to 
estimate the same counterfactual outcomes—those that would have been achieved had the Chicago 
TAP schools not implemented the program. (The treatment group in both cases is the same). The 
results suggest that the differences between the two counterfactual estimates were small (less than 
 
Figure IV.3. Comparing Experimental Control Group to the Quasi- Experimental Comparison Group 
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one ISAT point) and not significant, except for the math scores from spring 2008.20
Table IV.12. Matched Comparison Group vs. Randomized Control Group: Differences in March ISAT 
Scores by Subject 
 In that year, 
students in the matched comparison schools scored two or three points lower, depending on which 
matching method we used, than students in the randomized control group schools. If we assume 
that the scores of the randomized control group are an exact representation of the counterfactual 
outcome (as opposed to an approximation), then it would follow that the matched comparison 
group outcomes are underestimated by two or three points, and thereby overstate the size of the 
true impacts. However, when we look at the other period of overlap, represented by the 2010 results 
comparing the control group (cohort 4) to the matched comparison group, there is no significant 
difference between the experimentally and quasi-experimentally estimated counterfactual outcomes, 
consistent with the quasi-experimental estimates being unbiased.  
  Reading   Math   Science 


















2007–2008 (cohorts 1 & 2)         
Nearest neighbors -0.6 0.6  -2.8*** 0.9  NA NA 
Caliper (r = 0.025) -0.4 0.5  -2.0** 0.9  NA NA 
Kernel density -0.4 0.5  -2.0** 0.9  NA NA 
2009–2010 (cohorts 3 & 4)         
Nearest neighbors -0.1 0.6  -0.9 0.9  0.5 1.3 
Caliper (r = 0.025) -0.1 0.6  -0.7 0.8  -0.2 0.8 
Kernel density 0.1 0.6  0.3 0.9  2.1 1.6 
Note:  NA = data not available. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
It is difficult to determine which of the overlapping design results, the interpretation of upward 
bias or the interpretation of no bias, to generalize to the rest of the quasi-experimental analysis. 
There are two obvious choices. One is to accept all of the quasi-experimental estimates as the best 
available information and assume no bias. The other is to assume that the quasi-experimental 
estimates of math impacts are upwardly biased by approximately two ISAT points, in which case 
even the few examples of positive impact are likely overstated. In either case, we would conclude 
that Chicago TAP was not successful in raising student test scores over the time horizon covered by 
this study. 
 
                                                 
20 The difference for science scores in 2010 is also greater than one ISAT point for one of the matching estimators 
(difference = 2.1 ISAT points for science using kernel density matching), but that result is imprecisely estimated and not 
significant. In other words, the science results are based on fewer grades, thus a smaller sample; thus we cannot consider 
them to be a good test of the matching method against the experimental benchmark. 
 This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
 51 
V. IMPACTS ON TEACHER RETENTION 
Chicago TAP is hypothesized to help schools retain their best teachers by rewarding 
performance, providing professional development and leadership opportunities, and creating a 
career ladder. In this chapter we examine the impacts of Chicago TAP on the rate at which teachers 
were retained by their schools from year to year and over longer periods of time. 
For the retention analysis, the matched comparison sample—not the randomized control 
group—is the most credible benchmark to use for the Chicago TAP sample. As discussed in 
Chapter II, we randomly assigned schools to either a treatment group that implemented Chicago 
TAP right away or to a control group that delayed implementation by one year. Teachers in control 
schools knew that their school would be adopting Chicago TAP soon, and that knowledge might 
have influenced the career plans of the schools’ teachers. For that reason, the randomized control 
group is a contaminated source of information on outcomes such as retention that may be 
influenced by future Chicago TAP participation. Therefore, we rely only on the matched 
comparison sample of non-TAP schools. These comparison schools were identified through 
propensity score matching as being similar to Chicago TAP schools on preintervention measures of 
retention, student achievement, and other variables (see Chapter II and Appendix A for further 
details on the matching methodology). 
We estimate impacts by comparing teacher retention rates observed in Chicago TAP schools to 
those observed in matched comparison schools that did not implement Chicago TAP. The retention 
rates in the matched comparison schools are used to approximate the retention rates that would 
have been observed in the absence of Chicago TAP; these non-TAP retention rates reflect economic 
conditions, layoffs, and other policies that affected schools throughout the district.  
Unfortunately, we are unable to estimate the impact of Chicago TAP on the quality of teachers 
retained because we lack reliable measures of teacher quality for both Chicago TAP and non-TAP 
schools. Nevertheless, the teacher retention rate itself is of policy interest because of the costs 
associated with turnover. In addition to the financial costs associated with hiring replacement 
teachers, high teacher turnover may contribute to teacher shortages, lead to out-of-field teaching, 
and hinder the development of cohesive learning communities within schools, all factors that can 
adversely affect student achievement. 
A. Impacts on Teacher Retention over Time 
We measured retention by obtaining teaching assignments for the late fall of each school year 
from district administrative records. A classroom teacher was considered retained if he or she 
worked in the same school in fall of the base year and fall of the follow-up years. The 2007–2008 
school year marked the start of a four-year period during which Chicago TAP would be in place, so 
we focus on teacher retention throughout that period. We did not examine retention of teachers 
beyond that period because between the third and fourth year of implementation, the district 
indicated that Chicago TAP would not be continued (Ahmed 2010). Thus, we examined the 
retention of teachers from fall 2007 through fall 2010. Over that period, we were able to observe 
teachers’ year-to-year retention (fall 2007–fall 2008, fall 2008–fall 2009, or fall 2009–fall 2010), 
retention over two years (fall 2007–fall 2009 or fall 2008–fall 2010), or retention over the three years 
(fall 2007–fall 2010). We could also estimate separate impacts by Chicago TAP cohort. This was 
helpful in case we wanted to understand the relationship between the number of years of 
implementation and retention.  
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The possible retention outcomes by duration (one-, two-, or three-year retention), year, and 
Chicago TAP cohort are presented in Figure V.1. For each outcome, we estimated the impact of 
Chicago TAP by comparing retention in the Chicago TAP schools represented in each blue box to 
retention in the matched comparison schools. Matching was done using the nearest-five-neighbors 
method discussed in Chapter II and in Appendix A. When the retention outcome was available for 
more than one cohort, we combined across cohorts to increase statistical power. We also assessed 
the robustness of the overall impacts to the choice of matching method by presenting estimates 
produced using alternative matching strategies. Because Chicago TAP is a school-specific program, 
we focus primarily on Chicago TAP’s impact on schools’ retention of teachers (“school retention”); 
we present findings for the retention of teachers in the district (“district retention”) in Appendix B 
(Tables B.8–B.11 and Figure B.1). 
Figure V.1. Retention Outcomes by Year, Duration, and Cohort 
 
Note:  Each blue box represents a group of classroom teachers in schools of the indicated cohort   
(1, 2, or 3) followed from fall of the base year to fall of the follow-up year.  
We found positive, statistically significant impacts of Chicago TAP on year-to-year retention 
rates for the first two years of program rollout (Table V.1). In particular, we estimated that 85 
percent of teachers in fall 2007 would have returned to their schools in fall 2008 had they been in 
Chicago TAP, compared to 77 percent of teachers had they been in non-TAP schools, indicating an 
impact of eight percentage points. For fall 2008–fall 2009, we found a three-percentage-point 
impact, with an average retention rate of 83 percent for teachers in Chicago TAP schools compared 
to 80 percent of teachers in non-TAP schools. The estimated Chicago TAP-comparison difference 
for fall 2009–fall 2010 was smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant. 
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One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008  
(cohort 1) 85.2 77.2 7.9*** 3.01 1,102 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 
(cohorts 1 & 2) 82.8 79.6 3.2* 1.83 1,686 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 
(cohorts 1, 2, & 3) 81.2 80.9 0.3 1.81 2,694 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009  
(cohort 1) 77.8 59.5 18.3*** 4.87 881 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 
(cohorts 1 & 2) 71.2 67.9 3.3 2.76 1,879 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010  
(cohort 1) 67.0 55.5 11.5*** 4.21 781 
Note:  School retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base 
year who worked at the same school in fall of the follow-up year. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
To provide another perspective on retention, we also compared the two-year and three-year 
teacher retention rates of Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools (Table V.1). We found that for 
teachers present at the start of rollout in the district, Chicago TAP had a positive, statistically 
significant impact on two-year school retention, defined as the percentage of teachers returning in 
fall 2009 to the schools where they taught in fall 2007. The average two-year retention rate for 
teachers in Chicago TAP schools exceeded that of teachers in comparison schools by 18 percentage 
points (78 percent versus 60 percent). When measured from fall 2008, however, the estimated 
impact on two-year retention rates—three points—was not statistically significant. Similar to the 
two-year retention finding for teachers present for district rollout of the program, we found a 
statistically significant impact of Chicago TAP on the three-year retention rate; 67 percent of fall 
2007 teachers in Chicago TAP schools taught in the same school three years later compared to 56 
percent of teachers in non-TAP schools. In other words, teachers in Chicago TAP schools in fall 
2007 were about 20% more likely than teachers in comparison schools to be in those same schools 
three years later.   
We hypothesized that teachers in tested grades and subjects would behave differently from 
those in nontested grades and subjects because only teachers in tested grades and subjects had a 
direct effect on value-added measures that help determine performance-based compensation. We 
found evidence to support this hypothesis, but the pattern of subgroup findings was not consistent 
across the retention outcomes (Table V.2). Estimated impacts for teachers in tested grades and 
subjects and teachers in academic but nontested grades or subjects tended to be positive. Findings 
were more varied for teachers in “other” nonacademic subjects; Chicago TAP-comparison 
differences for this subgroup were positive for half of the retention rates we examined and negative 
for the other half. The relative magnitudes of the estimates across the three subgroups and the 
statistical significance of the findings varied as well. 
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One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 85.2 77.2 7.9*** 3.01 1,102 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 89.2 84.2 5.0* 2.85 323 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 90.9 79.7 11.2*** 3.25 497 
Other 92.8 82.6 10.2** 4.17 164 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
All teachers 82.8 79.6 3.2* 1.83 1,686 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 86.5 82.3 4.2 3.14 551 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 88.1 83.8 4.3* 2.24 777 
Other 83.0 80.3 2.7 3.89 239 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3)     
All teachers 81.2 80.9 0.3 1.81 2,694 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 80.6 83.0 -2.4 3.18 903 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 86.5 83.6 3.0 2.16 1,290 
Other 75.2 76.3 -1.1 4.70 385 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 77.8 59.5 18.3*** 4.87 881 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 82.0 70.3 11.6* 6.05 278 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 88.8 78.0 10.8** 5.29 399 
Other 78.8 52.3 26.5** 12.89 114 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
All teachers 71.2 67.9 3.3 2.76 1,879 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 75.9 72.8 3.1 4.43 587 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 79.7 73.8 6.0* 3.17 888 
Other 57.7 59.3 -1.6 6.48 264 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 67.0 55.5 11.5*** 4.21 781 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 77.9 56.0 21.8*** 5.85 221 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 73.2 65.8 7.4 4.75 366 
Other 29.4 55.6 -26.3** 10.80 106 
Note:  School retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base year who 
worked at the same school in fall of the follow-up year. Teaching assignment category is missing for 118 
teachers for fall 2007–fall 2008, 119 teachers for fall 2008–fall 2009, 116 teachers for fall 2009–fall 
2010, 90 teachers for fall 2007–fall 2009, 140 teachers for fall 2008–fall 2010, and 88 teachers for fall 
2007–fall 2010.  
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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We also examined teacher experience subgroups, defined by years of service in CPS (Table V.3). 
Although we did find differences among experience subgroups, there was not a consistent pattern in 
the findings across outcomes. For the one-year rates, Chicago TAP-comparison differences tend to 
be positive for both early- and mid-career teachers and negative for late-career teachers. For the 
two- and three-year rates, estimated impacts were consistently positive for all three experience 
subgroups. As with the teaching assignment subgroups, the relative magnitudes of the estimates 
across the experience subgroups and the statistical significance of the findings varied with the 
particular period examined. 
Table V.3. Impacts on School Retention Rates, by Years of Service (percentage) 









One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 85.2 77.2 7.9*** 3.01 1,102 
<5 years  76.4 67.6 8.8* 4.84 371 
5–24 years  89.3 82.4 6.9*** 2.48 634 
>24 years 100.0 95.8 4.1 3.60 97 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2) 
    
All teachers 82.8 79.6 3.2* 1.83 1,686 
<5 years  96.8 95.0 1.7 1.28 538 
5–24 years  86.6 85.3 1.3 2.36 1,010 
>24 years 81.0 83.6 -2.6 5.68 138 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3) 
    
All teachers 81.2 80.9 0.3 1.81 2,694 
<5 years  73.3 70.5 2.8 4.43 731 
5–24 years  85.9 86.0 -0.1 1.78 1741 
>24 years 61.6 76.8 -15.2* 9.16 222 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 77.8 59.5 18.3*** 4.87 881 
<5 years  77.8 64.0 13.8** 6.63 301 
5–24 years  86.1 70.9 15.2** 6.16 495 
>24 years 90.8 64.2 26.6*** 9.63 85 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2) 
    
All teachers 71.2 67.9 3.3 2.76 1,879 
<5 years  68.3 59.3 9.0 6.06 540 
5–24 years  76.3 74.4 1.9 3.50 1,165 
>24 years 54.8 50.8 4.0 12.26 174 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 67.0 55.5 11.5*** 4.21 781 
<5 years  65.4 48.8 16.6* 8.94 247 
5–24 years  71.2 60.0 11.3** 4.55 469 
>24 years 64.0 40.3 23.7 33.12 65 
Note:  School retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base year who 
worked at the same school in fall of the follow-up year.  
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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We caution that these subgroup findings were based on relatively small samples and were 
sensitive to estimation decisions such as whether to allow into the potential comparison sample 
schools known to have closed in future years. The findings may reflect chance differences that were 
not caused by Chicago TAP. 
As a robustness check, we estimated differences in the overall retention rates between Chicago 
TAP and comparison schools using alternative methods to construct the non-TAP matched 
comparison groups. The school retention findings presented above were estimated using the 
nearest-five-neighbors method, which we found did the most to reduce differences between Chicago 
TAP and non-TAP schools on observable preintervention characteristics. The sign of the estimated 
Chicago TAP-comparison differences was generally consistent across alternative matching methods, 
but the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimates varied with the method used (Table 
V.4). We found that single nearest neighbor matching was very unstable.  
The estimates presented above provide suggestive evidence of a positive impact of Chicago 
TAP on school retention. We found positive, statistically significant impacts for teacher retention 
rates measured from the beginning of the Chicago TAP rollout, including the one-year rate (fall 
2007–fall 2008), the two-year rate (fall 2007–fall 2009), and the three-year rate (fall 2007–fall 2010). 
These three retention rates, however, can be measured only for cohort 1. Impacts of Chicago TAP 
for retention rates that incorporate other cohorts tend to be positive but smaller in magnitude and 
not statistically significant. Figure V.2 presents the impact estimates separately by year, duration, and 
cohort. The pattern of findings suggests that teacher retention rates tend to be higher in Chicago 
TAP schools than in non-TAP schools; however, while half of the impact estimates were at least 
seven percentage points in magnitude and statistically significant, the other half were five points or 
fewer in magnitude and were not statistically significant. It is possible that the treatment effects were 
stronger for some groups of schools than others—for reasons we cannot explain with our data—or 
that the matching method worked differently for some cohorts than others. The findings broken 
down by cohort suggest that impacts were strongest for cohort 1. The one opportunity we had to 
observe the retention behavior of teachers in cohort 3, from fall 2009 to fall 2010, indicated that 
Chicago TAP teachers were retained at lower rates than their comparison group counterparts, but 
the difference was not statistically significant. 
We also examined district retention rates, defined as the rate at which teachers returned to CPS 
even if they changed schools. Increased district retention rates were not an explicitly hypothesized 
impact of Chicago TAP, but it could be true that the program strengthens teachers’ bonds with the 
district overall. However, we did not find consistent evidence of an impact of Chicago TAP on 
district retention. Among the main district retention outcomes examined using the nearest-five-
neighbors matching method, none of the Chicago TAP-comparison differences for teachers overall 
was statistically significant except for the fall 2007–fall 2009 retention rate. In the few cases in which 
statistically significant impacts emerged for particular subgroups, or for a cohort-specific impact in a 
particular year, there was not a clear pattern of findings. Overall district retention impacts were 
generally similar when estimated using alternative matching algorithms. The results are shown in 
Appendix B (Tables B.8–B.11 and Figure B.1). 
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One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1)     
Nearest neighbor 84.0 85.5 -1.5 2.83 499 
Nearest 5 neighbors 85.2 77.2 7.9*** 3.01 1,102 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 86.9 80.7 6.3*** 2.43 2,944 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 85.7 80.9 4.8** 1.90 11,739 
Kernel density  86.6 82.4 4.2*** 1.62 12,040 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
Nearest neighbor 82.3 79.4 2.9 2.84 661 
Nearest 5 neighbors 82.8 79.6 3.2* 1.83 1,686 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 
83.5 80.3 3.3** 1.59 2,678 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 
83.4 81.5 1.9 1.46 5,823 
Kernel density  84.0 81.8 2.2 1.37 11,422 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3)     
Nearest neighbor 81.9 82.7 -0.8 3.56 974 
Nearest 5 neighbors 81.2 80.9 0.3 1.81 2,694 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 
81.1 81.2 -0.1 2.01 3,290 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 
81.4 80.7 0.7 1.62 11,320 
Kernel density  81.4 81.1 0.3 1.69 11,340 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1)     
Nearest neighbor 89.0 30.4 58.6*** 6.29 322 
Nearest 5 neighbors 78.4 60.6 17.8*** 5.16 871 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.005) 
78.5 65.5 12.9*** 4.40 1,697 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 
78.1 66.7 11.4*** 3.37 5,775 
Kernel density  78.8 67.3 11.5*** 3.07 11,413 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
Nearest neighbor 71.4 70.4 1.0 2.61 631 
Nearest 5 neighbors 71.2 67.9 3.3 2.76 1,879 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 
71.6 66.5 5.2* 2.73 2,352 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 
71.2 68.6 2.6 1.84 10,819 
Kernel density  71.2 68.8 2.4 1.94 11,373 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1)     
Nearest neighbor 60.0 64.0 -3.9 3.50 265 
Nearest 5 neighbors 67.0 55.5 11.5*** 4.21 781 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 68.8 53.2 15.6*** 3.87 1,190 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 68.4 55.8 12.7*** 2.43 10,008 
Kernel density  66.6 58.3 8.3** 3.31 11,279 
Note:  School retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base year who 
worked at the same school in fall of the follow-up year. Shaded cells are based on the nearest-five-
neighbors method, which produced the closest match between Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools in 
diagnostic tests performed before the outcomes were examined. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
V: Impacts on Teacher Retention  Mathematica Policy Research 
58 
We further explored retention by examining the impacts of Chicago TAP on the pattern of 
teacher mobility, focusing on where the movers went. Table V.5 reports percentages of Chicago 
TAP and nearest-five-neighbors comparison teachers by their follow-up year destinations. We 
generally found significant differences between the mobility patterns of Chicago TAP and 
comparison schools, driven largely by differences in the percentages of teachers staying at the same 
school or moving to other CPS elementary schools. These results are not regression adjusted and 
may reflect differences in background characteristics that are unrelated to Chicago TAP. 
Figure V.2. Impacts on School Retention Rates by Year, Duration, and Cohort 
 
Note:  Each blue box represents a group of teachers in schools of the indicated cohort (1, 2, or 3) 
followed from fall of the base year to fall of the follow-up year. Numbers below the blue 
boxes are impacts of Chicago TAP on school retention rates estimated using the nearest-five-
neighbors matching method to form comparison groups. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table V.5. Impacts on Teacher Mobility by Destination (percentage) 
Destination 
Chicago TAP 
Mean Comparison Mean Difference 
One- Year Mobility    
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1)***    
Stayed at same school 81.7 75.0 6.7 
Moved to a Chicago TAP school 3.4 0.6 2.8 
Moved to a comparison school 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
Moved to other CPS elementary school 3.4 7.3 -3.9 
Moved to a CPS high school 1.3 1.3 0.0 
Moved to a citywide or central office position 0.0 1.7 -1.7 
Left CPS 10.2 13.1 -2.9 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2)    
Stayed at same school 81.0 77.1 3.9 
Moved to a Chicago TAP school 1.3 0.8 0.5 
Moved to a comparison school 1.3 1.5 -0.2 
Moved to other CPS elementary school 3.6 4.7 -1.1 
Moved to a CPS high school 0.5 0.4 0.2 
Moved to a citywide or central office position 1.8 3.7 -1.9 
Left CPS 10.5 11.8 -1.3 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3)*    
Stayed at same school 79.6 79.3 0.3 
Moved to a Chicago TAP school 1.0 0.6 0.4 
Moved to a comparison school 0.2 1.3 -1.2 
Moved to other CPS elementary school 2.1 3.1 -1.0 
Moved to a CPS high school 0.2 0.4 -0.2 
Moved to a citywide or central office position 1.5 1.1 0.4 
Left CPS 15.5 14.2 1.4 
Two- Year Mobility    
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1)***    
Stayed at same school 73.3 61.7 11.5 
Moved to a Chicago TAP school 2.7 2.2 0.5 
Moved to a comparison school 0.0 2.6 -2.6 
Moved to other CPS elementary school 4.3 9.2 -4.9 
Moved to a CPS high school 1.1 1.4 -0.3 
Moved to a citywide or central office position 2.1 3.7 -1.5 
Left CPS 16.6 19.3 -2.7 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2)*    
Stayed at same school 68.9 67.5 1.5 
Moved to a Chicago TAP school 2.2 1.0 1.2 
Moved to a comparison school 0.8 2.1 -1.3 
Moved to other CPS elementary school 3.5 6.4 -2.9 
Moved to a CPS high school 0.8 0.7 0.1 
Moved to a citywide or central office position 1.9 1.0 0.9 
Left CPS 21.9 21.3 0.6 
Three- Year Mobility    
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1)*    
Stayed at same school 64.5 56.4 8.1 
Moved to a Chicago TAP school 1.8 1.8 0.0 
Moved to a comparison school 0.0 2.2 -2.2 
Moved to other CPS elementary school 4.2 8.2 -3.9 
Moved to a CPS high school 1.2 2.1 -0.9 
Moved to a citywide or central office position 1.2 1.3 -0.1 
Left CPS 27.1 28.1 -1.0 
Note:  N = 235 Chicago TAP and 867 comparison teachers for fall 2007–fall 2008; 390 Chicago TAP and 1,296 
comparison teachers for fall 2008–fall 2009; 612 Chicago TAP and 2,082 comparison teachers for fall 
2009–fall 2010; 187 Chicago TAP and 694 comparison teachers for fall 2007–fall 2009; 370 Chicago TAP 
and 1,509 comparison teachers for fall 2008–fall 2010; and 166 Chicago TAP and 615 comparison 
teachers for fall 2007–fall 2010. We conducted a chi-square test to determine the statistical significance 
of the difference in the distributions for each retention outcome.   
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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B. Descriptive Analysis of Skills, Knowledge, and Responsibilities (SKR) 
Scores by Mobility Status 
Policymakers care not only about the teacher retention rate, but also about the quality of 
teachers retained. If Chicago TAP is successful in rewarding effective teachers, then ineffective 
teachers might prefer to leave the school and more effective teachers might prefer to stay on longer 
than they would otherwise. All else equal, one would expect such an improvement in the mix of 
teachers to result in more-effective teachers accounting for a higher proportion of the teacher 
workforce remaining in Chicago TAP schools than would have remained in the absence of Chicago 
TAP. Unfortunately, we could not compare the effectiveness of teachers in Chicago TAP schools to 
that of teachers in non-TAP schools because we lack reliable measures of teacher effectiveness that 
can be used in both Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools.  
However, we did examine scores obtained by teachers in Chicago TAP schools on a classroom 
observation rubric known as Skills, Knowledge, and Responsibilities (SKR). As part of establishing 
instructionally focused accountability, the Chicago TAP model calls for observations of teachers by 
the principal, lead teachers, and mentor teachers, all of whom undergo training and certification in 
using the SKR rubric. SKR scores are assigned based on observed classroom performance in four 
domains: designing and planning instruction, learning environment, instruction, and responsibilities. 
Each domain is rated on a five-point scale, with 1 indicating “needs improvement,” 3 indicating 
“proficient,” and 5 indicating “exemplary.” The composite SKR scores are used in determining 
performance-based compensation.  
Table V.6 reports average SKR scores among three groups of teachers based on their 
movement between a baseline and follow-up period: stayers, who remained in the same school; 
movers, who moved to another CPS school or to a citywide or central office position within CPS; 
and leavers, who left CPS. The average SKR score across all teachers in Chicago TAP schools on a 
five-point scale ranged from 3.0 to 3.4 depending on the period examined. For all periods, the 
standard deviation of the average SKR score was typically about 0.6 points, implying that about half 
the population scored within 0.4 points of the average.  
We did not find evidence that mobility affected the composition of teachers who remain in 
Chicago TAP schools. For three of the six periods examined, the differences in average SKR scores 
across groups were not statistically significant.21
We emphasize that this descriptive analysis does not provide causal evidence of Chicago TAP’s 
impact on teacher quality. Because SKR scores were not available for non-TAP schools, we cannot 
 For the three periods for we which we detected 
statistically significant differences, there was not a consistent pattern of average SKR scores across 
groups. During the one-year period from fall 2009 to fall 2010 and the two-year period from fall 
2007 to fall 2009, teachers who left their school but remained in CPS (movers) had higher average 
scores than stayers or leavers. From fall 2008 to fall 2010, however, stayers and movers had the same 
average score; their average score exceeded that for leavers. Each group had an average score within 
0.4 points of the other two groups in all six periods. 
                                                 
21 We conducted an F-test using analysis of variance and failed to reject the hypothesis that the three average SKR 
scores were the same. 
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estimate what the SKR scores of stayers, movers, and leavers would have been in the absence of 
Chicago TAP. 
Table V.6. SKR Scores by Mobility Status (points) 
Mobility Period Stayers Movers Leavers 
Sample Size 
(teachers) 
One- Year Mobility     
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1) 3.4 3.2 3.2 221 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2) 3.1 2.9 3.0 357 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3)***  3.0 3.1 2.8 560 
Two- Year Mobility 
    
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1) 3.3 3.5 3.1 176 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2)** 3.1 3.1 2.9 338 
Three- Year Mobility 
    
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1) 3.2 3.4 3.1 158 
Note:  Mobility status is defined by the movement of classroom teachers from the base period to the 
follow-up period: stayers remained in the same school; movers moved to another CPS school 
or to a citywide or central office position within CPS; leavers left CPS. SKR scores are on a five-
point scale, with 5 being the highest score. For each mobility period, we conducted an 
analysis of variance F-test of the hypothesis that the three average SKR scores across mobility 
groups were the same. 
   * We reject the equality of mean SKR scores across mobility groups at the 10 percent level. 
  ** We reject the equality of mean SKR scores across mobility groups at the 5 percent level. 
*** We reject the equality of mean SKR scores across mobility groups at the 1 percent level. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The findings of the study can be summed up in terms of its three main questions: (1) How was 
Chicago TAP implemented? (2) What was its impact on student achievement? (3) What was its 
impact on teacher retention? We summarize the findings for each of these in turn and provide some 
concluding thoughts. 
A.  Implementation 
The current study was aimed at estimating the impacts of Chicago TAP on student and teacher 
outcomes, but the impact estimates must be interpreted in light of what was implemented. Based on 
evidence from several data sources, we conclude that Chicago TAP changed the way teachers were 
evaluated and compensated, their mentoring, and the career advancement opportunities in the 
schools that adopted the program. We conducted two surveys of teachers participating in Chicago 
TAP as well as teachers who had not yet begun participating in the program and teachers in schools 
that were not in the program at all. We found that in terms of mentoring, weekly meetings, career 
opportunities, and compensation, teacher reports were consistent with the goals of the program, and 
that Chicago TAP teachers’ experiences were sufficiently different from those of teachers in non-
TAP schools to conclude that real change occurred.  
Program review scores provide evidence on the extent to which Chicago TAP schools 
implemented the program with fidelity to the national TAP model. The average program review 
score was around 3 out of 5 for each cohort of schools in each of the first three years of rollout. 
NIET concluded that elements of TAP had been introduced, but TAP implementation had not been 
“rigorous.” After the third year of rollout, NIET informed CPS that the district had not 
implemented the TAP system. In the final year of rollout, when CPS conducted the program reviews 
instead of NIET, the average scores were higher than 4 out of 5. 
Two areas where program implementation did not occur as initially planned were the small size 
of the average performance-based payouts and the absence of a teacher-level value-added 
component to the teacher evaluation formula. The average teacher payouts in our data were never 
higher than $1,500 in the first year of implementation and never higher than $2,700 in subsequent 
years of implementation. The highest performance-based payout anyone ever received was $6,400. 
For a teacher earning $50,000 annually, these average payouts would represent 3 and 5 percent of 
salary, respectively, with the maximum just under 13 percent. Given that a CPS teacher with a 
bachelor’s degree and no experience might earn $50,000 to start, the Chicago TAP performance 
incentives in percentage terms would be much smaller for teachers with more education and 
experience, and consequently higher salary.22
                                                 
22 According to the CPS website (
 In each year of the program, individual teacher 
performance was measured using the SKR rubric. Value-added measures—those that use test score 
growth controlling for differences in student background—were calculated at the school level only 
until the final two years of Chicago TAP, when school-grade level estimates were also used. In other 
words, the program did not use teacher-level value-added measures in any of its payout formulas. 
www.cps-humanresources.org/careers/salary.htm, accessed January 5, 2012), the 
starting 38.6 week salary for a teacher with a bachelor’s degree was $50,577 in 2010–2011. 
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B. Impacts on Test Scores 
The changes that occurred in Chicago TAP schools did not translate into positive impacts on 
test scores in any consistent way. We found evidence of both positive and negative test score 
impacts in selected subjects, years, and cohorts of schools, but overall there was no detectable 
impact on math, reading, or science achievement that was robust to different methods of estimation. 
For example, impacts on science scores overall (across years and cohorts) were positive, but not 
statistically significant unless we used one particular matching method that excluded some Chicago 
TAP schools from the analysis. 
1. District Learning 
We tested the hypothesis that impacts on test scores might be small initially, but would grow as 
the school district became more familiar and experienced with Chicago TAP. According to this 
hypothesis, the staff operating the program would grow and refine their ability to support school 
principals and teachers over time. However, the evidence did not suggest that impacts grew over the 
four years in which the program was rolled out in Chicago. The impacts on scores in all three 
subjects (reading, math, and science) were largest in the third year (and statistically significant in 
reading), but fell in the fourth year to zero or negative and not statistically significant. 
2. School Learning 
We tested another hypothesis about start-up effects, which is that impacts on test scores would 
grow as individual schools became more accustomed to the program. Again, we found no consistent 
evidence of a learning effect from either the experimental or quasi-experimental analyses. We 
observed schools with one, two, three, and four years of experience implementing Chicago TAP but 
the years of experience had no relationship to size of the impact estimate. 
3. Other Explanations 
We considered other explanations and found nothing to suggest that there was a hidden 
positive impact of Chicago TAP on student achievement. For example, we considered the possibility 
that certain groups of schools, regardless of when they started or how much experience they had, 
were simply more successful with Chicago TAP than others, but we found no impact for any of the 
four cohorts examined on their own. There was evidence of a significant negative impact on reading 
scores for cohort 4 and a significant positive impact on math scores for cohort 2, but we should 
exercise caution in interpreting such results. The probability of erroneously labeling an estimate as 
significant rises as the number of hypothesis tests increases. In this case, we conducted 12 
hypothesis tests (three subjects for four cohorts). 
C. Impacts on Retention 
The other major outcome besides student achievement was teacher retention. Preventing large 
losses of teachers is important because it helps a school maintain its culture and avoid disruption. 
We hypothesized that teachers would find aspects of Chicago TAP appealing and would want to 
continue teaching in their schools at a higher rate than they would have if their school had not 
participated in Chicago TAP. 
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We found that teachers who were working in Chicago TAP schools in 2007 did return in each 
of the following three years at higher rates than teachers in comparable non-TAP schools. When we 
looked at teachers who were working in schools that started in later years, some of the impact 
estimates were not statistically significant. We also found some evidence that impacts on retention 
were stronger for subgroups of teachers, such as those with less experience, but the pattern was not 
consistent. The overall conclusion was that Chicago TAP most likely had an impact, inducing 
teachers to stay longer in their schools, but the impacts were not uniform or universal across years, 
cohorts, and subgroups of teachers. 
To understand the retention findings in more depth we examined the destination of teachers 
who did not return to their schools, and we tabulated for teachers in Chicago TAP schools the 
observed performance of stayers, movers (those who left their school but stayed within CPS), and 
leavers. We did not find much evidence that Chicago TAP helped prevent teachers from leaving the 
district. Much of the attrition from study schools was due to movement between schools. When we 
examined the SKR scores of stayers, movers, and leavers, we failed to find evidence that attrition 
came from the top or bottom of the teacher performance distribution in Chicago TAP schools. 
Comparable data were not available for non-TAP schools, but if a similar pattern held in all schools, 
we could conclude that teacher attrition was not changing the composition of the schools very 
dramatically. Thus the chief benefit of a positive impact on retention appears to be through 
reduction in the disruptive effect of turnover and of having to find replacement teachers. 
D. Conclusions 
Implementation of Chicago TAP increased the amount of mentoring, promotion opportunity, 
and compensation relative to non-TAP schools, and these increases alone may have translated into 
making Chicago TAP schools a more desirable place to continue working, as evidenced by the 
positive impacts on retention. However, these changes did not in turn result in higher student 
achievement, often considered the “bottom line” for education interventions, within the specified 
four-year time frame.  
Despite the real changes in Chicago TAP schools noted in the implementation section, some 
key aspects of performance-based pay were not really tested: (1) there was no individual teacher-
level component of test-based accountability; and (2) the rewards may not have been sufficiently 
meaningful and differentiated—they fall just below the thresholds suggested by the U.S. Department 
of Education, for example, in its guidance to applicants to the most recent round of the Teacher 
Incentive Fund competition.23
Chicago TAP was only partially successful in achieving its goals. The program can be credited 
with improved retention outcomes for some of its schools, but it did not have a noticeable positive 
impact on student achievement over the four-year rollout in Chicago. This result provides a caution 
to funders investing in future programs in terms of what to expect over a four-year period. 
However, designers of new policies might consider how to change selected program elements to 
produce more favorable outcomes in the future. 
 
                                                 
23 The Federal Register notice (http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-12218.pdf, accessed January 5, 2012) 
provides an example of a meaningful and differentiated compensation system as one with an average payout of 5 percent 
of average teacher salary with a possible payout of 15 percent for top-performing teachers and principals, or at least 
levels that are “high enough to create change in the behavior of current and prospective teachers and principals.” 
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We identified nearly 400 CPS K–8 elementary schools to serve as potential matched 
comparison schools for the Chicago TAP schools in the study (cohorts 1, 2, 3, and 4). To form the 
best possible comparison group from among these schools, we employed several propensity score 
matching methods (algorithms). Using the same set of propensity scores, each algorithm selects a 
different set of comparison schools and generates a corresponding set of weights. The goal was to 
find a comparison group with a close fit to the Chicago TAP schools under study, as judged by 
preintervention measures of the school characteristics that are related to study outcomes (baseline 
covariates). Because we conducted analyses over several years, we rematched in each year using the 
same baseline covariates but a different set of Chicago TAP schools, depending on which ones were 
implementing the program in that year. We did this separately for the test score analysis and for the 
retention analysis because the set of Chicago TAP schools in each analysis differed slightly in any 
given year. The procedures are described in Chapter II. This appendix provides additional detail on 
the matching algorithms and how we selected one to use as a default for presentation purposes. 
The process of matching schools and selecting a comparison group consisted of several steps. 
First, we first applied filters to the universe of CPS K–8 elementary schools in each year to create a 
set of potential comparison schools that matched the Chicago TAP schools on basic characteristics. 
We then included the Chicago TAP schools and the potential comparison schools in a logistic 
regression model that used a number of matching variables to predict the probability of being 
selected into the Chicago TAP finalist pool. Using the predicted probabilities (“propensity scores”) 
from this regression, different matching algorithms were then applied to create alternative 
comparison groups. Finally, we conducted diagnostics to select one matching algorithm to highlight 
in the presentation of results. Below we provide further details about this process. 
1.  Exact Match Criteria/Filters 
Before estimating propensity scores, we first selected as potential comparison schools those that 
met the following basic criteria: 
• The school was open during the 2006–2007 school year and had data from that year. 
• The school had at least five of the six tested grades, which were grades three through 
eight. 
• At least 50 percent of the school’s students were low income (defined as being eligible 
for free/reduced-price lunch). To be eligible for Chicago TAP, the school had to serve at 
least 75 percent low-income students. We used percentage of low-income students as a 
matching variable, but allowed the possibility of schools below the eligibility threshold 
matching with schools above it. This restriction prevents matching to schools with 
especially low percentages of low-income students. 
• For teacher retention analysis only: The school was not a charter school. Teaching 
assignments for charter schools were not available in the administrative data provided by 
CPS. 
• For teacher retention analysis only: The school was not selected for Chicago TAP. We 
did not want the possibility of a comparison school’s staff knowing it would be 
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implementing the program in the future, as such knowledge could affect teachers’ 
decisions to return to the school.24
2.  Matching Variables 
 (Note that for the test score analysis, we allowed a 
future Chicago TAP school to serve as a comparison school during a year before they 
implemented Chicago TAP.) 
We matched schools on variables that were measured before the rollout of Chicago TAP, 
including preintervention measures of the outcomes of interest: student test scores and teacher 
retention.25
We also used 2006–2007 student demographic information, including total school enrollment, 
enrollment squared (to improve matches for very small or large schools), and race/ethnicity. 
Because we observed that most Chicago TAP schools could be categorized as nearly all African 
American, with a few nearly all Hispanic or mixed, we collapsed school race/ethnicity into a small 
number of categories to emphasize substantive, rather than minute, qualitative differences. If less 
than one-third of a school’s students were African American, it was given a value of 1; if one-third 
to two-thirds were African American, it had a value of 2; and more than two-thirds had a value of 3. 
(This is equivalent to rounding the fraction of African American students to the nearest third). We 
coded the percentage of Hispanic students in the same way. We also used the percentages of 
students who were low income (eligible for free/reduced-price lunch), in special education (had an 
Individualized Education Program), and limited English proficient. Finally, we used indicators of 
whether the school had made adequate yearly progress toward goals under No Child Left Behind 
and, for the student achievement analysis, whether the school was a charter school.  
 We standardized spring 2007 math and reading ISAT scores within grade to have a 
common mean and standard deviation by grade (zero and one, respectively) and then averaged 
across grades for each school. Standardizing the test scores reduces the influence of having different 
proportions of students in different grade levels. Retention rates were based on CPS human 
resources data and expressed as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall 2005 returning as 
classroom teachers in fall 2006 to the same school. Separately, we measured retention for teachers 
who were in their first four years of service in the district and those who had 5 to 24 years of service. 
We did not take into account retention rates for teachers close to retirement age. This group could 
not be stably estimated, nor does retention at this stage have the same interpretation as novice and 
midcareer retention. 
All of the matching variables were used in a logistic regression to estimate the theoretical 
probability for selecting a pool of Chicago TAP schools to enter the program. The predicted 
probability is the propensity score. We examined the score distributions and selected or reweighted 
potential comparison schools to form the best possible comparison group. 
                                                 
24 Two exceptions occurred to this retention analysis filter. We allowed cohort 3 and 4 schools to be comparison 
schools for cohort 1 schools in 2007–2008. Because teachers in cohort 3 and 4 schools did not learn of their future 
Chicago TAP status until spring 2009, fall 2007 to fall 2008 retention could not have been affected by knowledge of 
future Chicago TAP status. We also allowed the noncharter cohort 4 replacement school to be a comparison school for 
cohort 1 and 2 schools in 2008–2009 because the school was not announced as a replacement school until spring 2010; 
the school’s future Chicago TAP status could not have affected fall 2008 to fall 2009 retention decisions. 
25 For a small number of schools that expanded by more than two grades between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, we 
used a later baseline. All variables except teacher retention for these schools were measured in 2008–2009; teacher 
retention was measured as the percentage of teachers in fall 2007 who returned to the school in fall 2008. 
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3.  Matching Algorithms 
There are several alternative algorithms for selecting a comparison group, each of which has 
advantages and disadvantages. The nearest-neighbor method is probably the most intuitive because 
it is analogous to a balanced random assignment experiment and gives each Chicago TAP school a 
fixed number of comparison schools (albeit with some counting more than once because of 
replacement). The propensity score was used to rank all the schools sequentially along a number 
line. We formed two nearest-neighbor comparison groups: one using the single nearest neighbor to 
each Chicago TAP school and the other using the nearest five neighbors. We selected the nearest 
neighbors with replacement so that each Chicago TAP school in each year was matched to the non-
TAP schools whose propensity scores were closest to the Chicago TAP school, regardless of 
whether the non-TAP schools were also among the nearest neighbors of any other Chicago TAP 
school. Non-TAP schools matched with more than one Chicago TAP school received 
proportionally more weight in the analysis.  
Another algorithm is called the caliper method because we define a fixed distance (the radius of 
a caliper) in terms of propensity score from each Chicago TAP school and select all comparison 
schools that fall within that distance. The radius size for the caliper is arbitrary and involves a trade-
off between the quality and quantity of matches. A larger radius captures more comparison schools, 
but a smaller one captures schools that are more closely matched. We examined radii of different 
lengths and used the ones that rendered superior matches in terms of the matching variables 
described above. With very small radii we found that some Chicago TAP schools had no matches; 
rather than discard these schools, we used larger radii. 
Finally, we used kernel density matching, which uses the full set of comparison schools but 
allows the weights to vary with distance from Chicago TAP schools. For each Chicago TAP school, 
the weight corresponding to each comparison school is smaller as the distance from the Chicago 
TAP school is greater.26
4. Diagnostics 
  
Most of the matching algorithms produced similar results, but we had to select one to simplify 
the presentation. We sought to make a selection based on the quality of the matches, which could be 
measured prior to seeing any outcome data. This task was complicated by the fact that we used 
propensity score matching to form comparison groups for each cohort and year and did so 
separately for the test score and retention analyses. Matching this many times meant that an 
algorithm that produced the closest balance in baseline covariates for one match might not do so for 
another. We decided to select one algorithm for all analyses, provided that it generated the greatest 
balance for key matches and acceptable balance for all other matches. 
We chose the nearest-five-neighbors approach because among the algorithms for which all 
Chicago TAP schools had matches, this algorithm reduced the initial Chicago TAP-comparison 
differences more than the others. In particular, the nearest-five-neighbors approach most often had 
the smallest mean standardized bias across all the matching covariates across the student 
                                                 
26 The magnitude of the weight is based on the probability density function (PDF) for the normal distribution, 
which looks like a bell-shaped curve sitting on a number line, centered on the propensity score for each Chicago TAP 
school. The weight is proportional to the height of the curve (the kernel) of the normal PDF. 
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achievement analyses, where the standardized bias for each covariate is the difference between the 
Chicago TAP and comparison group sample means as a percentage of the square root of the average 
of the sample variances in both groups. 
Table A.1 reports the sample sizes and mean standardized biases considered in selecting our 
preferred matching method. We first determined the number of Chicago TAP and comparison 
schools that could be matched for the student achievement analysis each year using each method. In 
presenting our findings, we preferred to highlight a matching method that always included all 
Chicago TAP elementary schools implementing the program; we therefore eliminated from 
consideration methods that failed to produce matches for all Chicago TAP schools in any year.27
 
 Of 
the remaining methods, we chose the one that most often had the smallest standardized mean bias, 
the nearest-five-neighbors method. 
 
                                                 
27 As shown in the main report, we assess the robustness of our findings to choice of matching method by also 
reporting results estimated using alternative matching methods that sometimes discard Chicago TAP schools. 
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Sample Sizes (schools) 
Chicago TAP Comparison 
2007–2008 (cohort 1)  
  
Nearest neighbor 16.8 9 9 
Nearest 5 neighbors 13.6 9 34 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.005) 
12.3 9 105 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 
8.4 9 385 
Kernel density  13.4 9 391 
2008–2009 (cohorts 1 & 2)  
  
Nearest neighbor 15.2 18 18 
Nearest 5 neighbors 8.9 18 77 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.005) 
3.3 17a 207 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 
3.9 17a 375 
Kernel density  7.1 18 379 
2009–2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3)  
  
Nearest neighbor 12.7 25 25 
Nearest 5 neighbors 4.0 25 97 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.005) 
2.6 22a 180 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 
2.9 24a 368 
Kernel density  3.7 25 369 
2010–2011 (cohorts 1, 2, 3, & 4)  
  
Nearest neighbor 8.5 33 28 
Nearest 5 neighbors 2.9 33 100 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.005) 
4.6 29a 148 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 
4.7 31a 357 
Kernel density  2.3 32a 359 
Note:  Matching methods shown in red were not chosen as the preferred method because they did 
not produce a match for at least one Chicago TAP school in at least one year. The nearest-
five-neighbors method, shown shaded, had the smallest mean standardized bias among the 
methods that produced matches for all Chicago TAP schools in every year. Williams 
Elementary (serving grades pre-K–five) and Williams Middle (serving grades six–eight) were 
selected for Chicago TAP cohort 3; these two schools were combined as a single “virtual” 
school in the analyses. 
a At least one Chicago TAP school did not have a match and was discarded from the sample. 
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Received professional advice and assistance in 
teaching duties from an advisor (percentage) 
96.7 75.2 21.6*** 3.21 
Had an advisor who was a(n) . . . (percentage)     
Mentor 57.4 8.7 48.7*** 3.32 
Literacy coach 43.8 42.9 0.9 11.03 
Math coach 23.4 22.2 1.2 10.04 
Lead teacher 75.0 11.9 63.1*** 5.06 
Principal 64.7 35.5 29.2*** 6.78 
Assistant or vice principal 47.5 31.6 15.8 8.34 
Peer 40.9 32.2 8.7 5.76 
Had a main advisor who was a . . . (percentage)     
Full-time teacher 61.0 36.2 24.8*** 4.08 
Person who works in teacher’s school only 83.7 55.3 28.4*** 6.47 
Person who works in more than one school 5.5 14.2 -8.7*** 3.29 
Teacher with release time 45.9 24.0 21.9*** 7.02 
Person with no classroom teaching 60.9 39.6 21.3*** 6.93 
Principal or school administrator 20.6 19.9 0.8 5.85 
School-based specialist 43.2 34.9 8.4 7.00 
District specialist 3.0 5.3 -2.3 1.76 
Person from a teacher licensing, certification, or 
preparation program 
21.3 9.0 12.3*** 3.77 
Time spent with main advisor     
Frequency of scheduled meetings (number per 
week) 
1.4 0.8 0.6*** 0.13 
Duration of each scheduled meeting (minutes) 66.7 39.9 26.8*** 6.26 
Duration of informal contact (minutes per week) 76.3 48.4 27.9* 14.05 
Frequency of total contact (minutes per week) 173.1 86.6 86.5*** 19.41 
During most recent full week, scheduled time main 
advisor spent . . .  (minutes) 
    
Observing teacher teaching 27.7 15.6 12.0*** 4.20 
Meeting with teacher one-on-one 27.3 23.5 3.8 6.34 
Meeting with teacher together with other teachers 40.8 26.8 14.0* 6.86 
Modeling a lesson 20.6 6.2 14.4*** 3.25 
Coteaching a lesson 10.2 5.7 4.4 3.83 
Received useful feedback from main advisor 
(percentage) 
88.7 91.3 -2.6 2.85 
Note:  N = 304 to 382 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-control difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Provided formal mentoring services (percentage) 27.5 22.6 4.9 5.04 
Mentoring topics included . . . (percentage)     
Strategies for teaching literacy 25.9 18.0 7.9* 4.68 
Strategies for teaching math 16.8 17.0 -0.1 4.47 
Strategies for teaching other subjects 16.3 17.0 -0.7 4.83 
Increasing content area knowledge 17.3 18.6 -1.3 5.57 
Selecting or adapting curriculum materials 19.0 20.0 -1.0 3.94 
Teaching or aligning curriculum to meet state or 
district standards 
21.0 17.6 3.4 4.49 
Aligning local curriculum assessment to state 
standards 
17.6 16.4 1.2 3.70 
Setting instructional goals and determining ways 
to achieve them 
26.0 20.1 5.8 4.92 
Preparing students for standardized tests 18.9 14.4 4.5 4.32 
Using assessments to inform teaching 23.7 20.8 2.9 4.36 
Preparing lesson plans or other instructional 
activities 
22.4 19.5 2.9 4.52 
Providing differentiated instruction to meet 
student needs 
23.6 21.2 2.4 4.84 
Received release time for mentoring (percentage) 17.3 7.3 10.0*** 2.97 
Release time for mentoring (hours per week) 1.4 0.2 1.2*** 0.41 
Mentoring outside of specified contract hours  
(hours per week) 
1.9 0.9 1.0 0.67 
Teachers mentored (number) 2.1 0.8 1.3*** 0.44 
Frequency of scheduled meetings  
(number per week per teacher) 
0.4 0.6 -0.2 0.12 
Duration of each scheduled meeting (minutes) 13.8 10.0 3.8 3.15 
Informal contact with all teachers (minutes per 
week) 
69.0 26.6 42.4* 20.90 
Total contact with all teachers (minutes per week) 196.8 74.5 122.3** 55.89 
Mentoring activities included . . . (percentage)     
Observing teaching 26.3 18.6 7.6* 4.49 
Meeting with teachers one-on-one 27.6 19.8 7.8 5.13 
Meeting in small groups or clusters 23.9 11.2 12.7*** 3.57 
Modeling a lesson 25.2 18.9 6.4 4.73 
Coteaching a lesson 18.2 13.3 4.9 3.73 
Writing evaluations 19.6 10.9 8.7* 4.57 
During most recent full week, scheduled time spent 
 . . . (minutes) 
    
Observing teaching 51.0 29.8 21.2** 9.80 
Meeting with teachers one-on-one 38.9 19.8 19.2** 9.21 
Meeting in small groups or clusters 31.1 11.3 19.8** 7.98 
Modeling a lesson 23.8 16.0 7.9 10.12 
Coteaching a lesson 16.5 8.6 7.9 7.73 
Writing evaluations 41.2 5.7 35.4*** 11.99 
Note:  N = 291 to 315 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table B.3. Other Leadership Roles and Responsibilities (teachers with at least five years of 








Had other leadership roles or responsibilities beyond 
mentoring (percentage) 
37.1 48.3 -11.1* 5.95 
Other leadership roles included . . . (percentage)     
Being a lead teacher 14.2 12.8 1.4 2.55 
Being a department head or chair 0.8 1.6 -0.8* 0.46 
Being a grade-level lead teacher 9.2 20.9 -11.7* 6.13 
Being on a school improvement team 15.6 22.4 -6.8 5.15 
Being on a schoolwide committee/task force 11.1 16.2 -5.2 5.14 
Other leadership responsibilities included . . . 
(percentage) 
    
Setting school policies 8.8 10.1 -1.3 3.69 
Developing curriculum 13.4 20.0 -6.7* 3.96 
Reviewing/selecting curriculum 16.3 22.8 -6.6** 3.27 
Providing input on improving facilities/technology 10.5 16.0 -5.5 4.67 
Providing professional development activities 22.0 15.3 6.7** 3.32 
Developing standards 8.3 9.9 -1.6 4.18 
Evaluating teachers 1.1 0.1 1.0*** 0.38 
Associated with these other leadership roles and 
responsibilities, received . . . (percentage) 
    
Credit toward certification 6.3 7.0 -0.7 2.44 
Pay increase 16.3 1.6 14.7*** 4.09 
Note:  N = 303 to 311 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 








Frequency of observation (number in 2009–2010)     
Observation by principal or assistant principal 3.0 2.5 0.5 0.28 
Observation by mentor, coach, or lead teacher 3.3 1.9 1.4*** 0.29 
Frequency of feedback (number in 2009–2010)     
Feedback as part of a formal evaluation 2.5 2.1 0.4 0.23 
Feedback outside of a formal evaluation 2.7 2.1 0.6** 0.25 
Feedback on lesson plans 2.2 2.1 0.1 0.39 
Note:  N = 374 to 378 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Participated in professional development activities 
that addressed . . . (percentage) 
    
Strategies for teaching literacy 94.0 94.1 -0.1 2.62 
Strategies for teaching math 82.7 68.6 14.2*** 5.40 
Strategies for teaching other subjects 65.8 63.3 2.5 4.08 
Increasing content area knowledge 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.00 
Selecting or adapting curriculum materials 68.7 68.6 0.0 5.52 
Teaching or aligning curriculum to meet state or 
district standards 
80.6 78.3 2.3 5.80 
Aligning local or teacher-developed curriculum 
assessment to state standards 
69.1 70.2 -1.1 6.72 
Setting instructional goals and determining ways 
to achieve them 
77.6 81.0 -3.4 3.51 
Preparing students for standardized tests 72.6 72.7 0.0 6.15 
Using assessments to inform teaching 87.9 88.0 0.0 3.83 
Preparing lesson plans or other instructional 
activities 
76.6 75.1 1.5 3.39 
Providing differentiated instruction to meet 
student needs 
86.0 88.4 -2.4 3.58 
Responded that professional development in  
2009–2010 . . . (percentage) 
    
Was useful to their teaching 84.0 85.1 -1.1 4.66 
Was more satisfactory than in previous years 34.8 37.6 -2.8 3.60 
Had been implemented in their teaching 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.00 
In association with professional development,  
received . . . (percentage) 
    
Scheduled nonteaching time in contract year 83.0 68.6 14.4*** 4.20 
Other release time from teaching 45.1 48.5 -3.4 5.13 
Stipend 67.5 64.2 3.3 6.52 
Fee reimbursement 19.1 21.3 -2.2 5.46 
Travel or expense reimbursement 6.1 14.1 -8.1** 4.09 
Course credits toward certification 50.3 49.6 0.7 5.64 
Pay increase 26.5 22.1 4.4 4.58 
Recognition or higher ratings on an annual teacher 
evaluation 
25.0 27.8 -2.9 4.44 
Note: N = 367 to 383 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Academic-year base salary ($) 61,958 61,792 166 1,398.65 
Base salary included leadership compensation 
(percentage) 
12.2 13.3 -1.1 2.89 
Additional compensation for leadership was 
expected (percentage) 
22.3 7.0 15.3*** 3.37 
Expected amount of additional compensation for 
leadership ($) 
1,797 188 1,609*** 406.57 
Eligible for additional nonleadership compensation 
(percentage) 
81.5 39.7 41.8*** 5.56 
Eligible for additional nonleadership compensation 
based on . . . (percentage) 
    
Instructional performance 71.0 6.8 64.2*** 6.74 
Student achievement growth 64.0 8.0 56.0*** 5.64 
Instructional performance or student achievement 
growth 
78.1 9.2 68.9*** 6.02 
Subject matter taught 19.3 6.5 12.7*** 3.87 
Student population taught 13.4 7.6 5.8 3.59 
Professional development 32.8 31.5 1.2 6.64 
University courses taken 13.0 11.7 1.3 3.90 
Expected or had received additional nonleadership 
compensation (percentage) 
54.3 20.4 33.9*** 5.41 
Expected or had received additional nonleadership 
compensation based on… (percentage) 
    
Instructional performance 35.3 0.8 34.5*** 6.08 
Student achievement growth 28.1 1.0 27.1*** 5.19 
Instructional performance or student achievement 
growth 
43.0 1.1 41.9*** 5.86 
Subject matter taught 0.4 0.0 0.3* 0.18 
Student population taught 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Professional development 16.3 15.2 1.1 4.50 
University courses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Expected amount of additional nonleadership 
compensation ($) 
880 239 641*** 176.09 
Expected additional compensation from an outside 
job (percentage) 
12.1 14.7 -2.7 4.40 
Note:  N = 334 to 370 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Satisfied with . . . (percentage)     
Supportive atmosphere/collaboration with 
colleagues 
79.7 81.9 -2.2 4.78 
Administration support 76.3 79.3 -3.0 7.55 
Policies/practices input 73.9 75.7 -1.8 6.60 
Classroom autonomy 88.5 90.9 -2.5 3.71 
Professional development opportunities 88.4 86.7 1.7 3.02 
Caliber of colleagues 77.7 84.6 -6.9 6.19 
Salary and benefits 88.2 80.0 8.2*** 3.15 
Leadership opportunities 79.2 81.9 -2.7 4.50 
School policies 72.7 74.2 -1.5 6.11 
District policies 55.4 57.4 -2.0 7.89 
Agreed that the principal . . . (percentage)     
Works to create a sense of community 74.7 82.2 -7.6 7.58 
Is strongly committed to shared decision making 74.3 79.9 -5.6 6.99 
Promotes parent/community involvement 86.0 88.0 -2.1 4.72 
Supports and encourages risk taking 71.9 79.9 -7.9 6.81 
Is willing to make changes 87.6 84.7 2.9 5.36 
Strongly supports most changes 80.8 80.8 0.1 5.83 
Encourages trying new instructional methods 89.6 90.1 -0.5 4.40 
Note:  N = 370 to 379 teachers per outcome. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008  
(cohort 1) 92.3 89.6 2.7 2.26 1,102 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 
(cohorts 1 & 2) 91.2 89.7 1.5 1.40 1,686 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 
(cohorts 1, 2, & 3) 85.8 87.3 -1.5 1.60 2,694 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009  
(cohort 1) 86.6 81.9 4.7** 2.08 881 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 
(cohorts 1 & 2) 81.1 79.7 1.4 2.47 1,879 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010  
(cohort 1) 75.9 72.1 3.8 2.62 781 
Note:  District retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base 
year who worked in the district in fall of the follow-up year. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 92.3 89.6 2.7 2.26 1,102 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 93.4 92.5 0.9 2.29 323 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 96.2 91.5 4.8*** 1.81 497 
Other 98.8 97.2 1.5 1.81 164 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
All teachers 91.2 89.7 1.5 1.40 1,686 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 93.4 90.6 2.7 1.95 551 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 92.9 92.3 0.6 1.72 777 
Other 94.9 94.3 0.6 2.96 239 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3)     
All teachers 85.8 87.3 -1.5 1.60 2,694 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 83.4 88.8 -5.4* 3.10 903 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 90.5 88.5 2.0 1.86 1,290 
Other 84.1 90.9 -6.8* 3.55 385 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 86.6 81.9 4.7** 2.08 881 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 85.8 85.5 0.3 3.77 278 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 92.7 90.5 2.1 1.88 399 
Other 100.0 99.9 0.1 0.31 114 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
All teachers 81.1 79.7 1.4 2.47 1,879 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 83.0 82.9 0.1 3.88 587 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 85.4 84.5 0.9 2.46 888 
Other 78.1 75.5 2.6 6.71 264 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 75.9 72.1 3.8 2.62 781 
Academic subjects,  
tested grades/subjects 81.0 68.4 12.6** 5.10 221 
Academic subjects, nontested 
grades/subjects 78.8 80.2 -1.5 3.16 366 
Other 78.7 79.0 -0.3 6.94 106 
Note:  District retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base year who 
worked in the district in fall of the follow-up year. Teaching assignment category is missing for 118 
teachers for fall 2007–fall 2008, 119 teachers for fall 2008–fall 2009, 116 teachers for fall 2009–fall 
2010, 90 teachers for fall 2007–fall 2009, 140 teachers for fall 2008–fall 2010, and 88 teachers for fall 
2007–fall 2010.  
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table B.10. Impacts on District Retention Rates, by Years of Service (percentage) 









One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 92.3 89.6 2.7 2.26 1,102 
<5 years  89.2 87.1 2.1 3.28 371 
5–24 years  94.2 92.8 1.4 1.89 634 
>24 years 100.0 99.7 0.3 0.63 97 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2) 
    
All teachers 91.2 89.7 1.5 1.40 1,686 
<5 years  98.9 98.8 0.1 0.40 538 
5–24 years  94.9 93.8 1.1 1.21 1,010 
>24 years 81.2 86.0 -4.8 5.93 138 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3) 
    
All teachers 85.8 87.3 -1.5 1.60 2,694 
<5 years  81.5 82.6 -1.0 4.20 731 
5–24 years  89.8 91.4 -1.6 1.56 1,741 
>24 years 67.2 77.4 -10.2 8.64 222 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 86.6 81.9 4.7** 2.08 881 
<5 years  90.5 93.5 -3.0** 1.20 301 
5–24 years  97.8 93.8 4.0* 2.21 495 
>24 years 88.3 77.2 11.1 9.81 85 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2) 
    
All teachers 81.1 79.7 1.4 2.47 1,879 
<5 years  83.7 76.1 7.7** 3.54 540 
5–24 years  84.3 85.5 -1.3 2.91 1,165 
>24 years 55.2 51.5 3.8 12.14 174 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1)     
All teachers 75.9 72.1 3.8 2.62 781 
<5 years  75.9 71.1 4.8 5.33 247 
5–24 years  83.1 76.6 6.5 4.64 469 
>24 years 58.7 50.7 8.0 32.14 65 
Note:  District retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base 
year who worked in the district in fall of the follow-up year.  
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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One- Year Rates      
Fall 2007–fall 2008 (cohort 1)     
Nearest neighbor 93.6 94.4 -0.9 2.47 499 
Nearest 5 neighbors 92.3 89.6 2.7 2.26 1,102 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 93.7 91.4 2.3 1.90 2,944 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 92.8 91.8 1.1 1.85 11,739 
Kernel density  93.0 91.9 1.1 1.69 12,040 
Fall 2008–fall 2009 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
Nearest neighbor 92.4 90.5 1.9 2.46 661 
Nearest 5 neighbors 91.2 89.7 1.5 1.40 1,686 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 91.4 89.9 1.5 1.31 2,678 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 91.4 90.6 0.8 1.17 5,823 
Kernel density  91.5 90.6 0.9 1.11 11,422 
Fall 2009–fall 2010 (cohorts 1, 2, & 3)     
Nearest neighbor 87.3 89.2 -1.9 2.00 974 
Nearest 5 neighbors 85.8 87.3 -1.5 1.60 2,694 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 85.7 88.4 -2.6 1.69 3,290 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 85.9 87.8 -1.9 1.45 11,320 
Kernel density  85.9 87.7 -1.8 1.49 11,340 
Two- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2009 (cohort 1)     
Nearest neighbor 88.1 78.2 9.9*** 3.32 332 
Nearest 5 neighbors 86.6 81.9 4.7** 2.08 881 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.005) 87.0 83.2 3.8** 1.94 1,707 
Caliper match  
(radius = 0.025) 86.8 82.8 3.9*** 1.30 5,785 
Kernel density  87.0 83.4 3.7*** 1.17 11,423 
Fall 2008–fall 2010 (cohorts 1 & 2)     
Nearest neighbor 82.0 78.1 3.9 3.51 631 
Nearest 5 neighbors 81.1 79.7 1.4 2.47 1,879 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 81.0 79.4 1.7 2.40 2,352 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 81.0 80.2 0.8 2.17 10,819 
Kernel density  81.0 80.0 1.0 2.19 11,373 
Three- Year Rates 
     
Fall 2007–fall 2010 (cohort 1)     
Nearest neighbor 74.2 71.3 2.9 3.75 265 
Nearest 5 neighbors 75.9 72.1 3.8 2.62 781 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.005) 76.9 71.2 5.7* 3.01 1,190 
Caliper match  
(r = 0.025) 75.9 73.6 2.3 1.76 10,008 
Kernel density  75.1 74.5 0.6 1.87 11,279 
Note:  District retention rate is defined as the percentage of classroom teachers in fall of the base year who 
worked in the district in fall of the follow-up year. Shaded cells are based on the nearest-five-neighbors 
method, which produced the closest match between Chicago TAP and non-TAP schools in diagnostic tests 
performed before the outcomes were examined. 
a Means are regression adjusted. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure B.1. Impacts on District Retention Rates by Year, Duration, and Cohort 
 
Note:  Each blue box represents a group of teachers in schools of the indicated cohort (1, 2, or 3) 
followed from fall of the base year to fall of the follow-up year. Numbers below the blue 
boxes are impacts of Chicago TAP on school retention rates estimated using the nearest-five-
neighbors matching method to form comparison groups. 
   * Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
  ** Chicago TAP-comparison difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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